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INTRODUCTION

I

N September 2012, eighty-one companies with nonsensical names
such as CleOrv, DucPla, and EntNil began sending letters to over
16,000 businesses throughout the United States. 1 The letters stated that
the sender was the “licensing agent” for several U.S. patents that cover
the use of an office scanner to send documents via e-mail. 2 The letters
noted that the recipient “almost certainly uses” that technology and that,
accordingly, the recipient “should enter into a license agreement with us
at this time” at a “fair price” of approximately $1,200 per employee. 3
Many recipients of that letter received two subsequent letters from a
Texas-based law firm, Farney Daniels. The first letter noted that the
matter had been referred to the firm and that its representation “can involve litigation.” 4 The second letter stated bluntly that “if we do not hear
from you within two weeks from the date of this letter, our client will be
forced to file a Complaint against you for patent infringement in Federal
District Court.” 5 This second letter also included a draft complaint
against the recipient. 6
1
Samples of these letters can be found in a complaint for unfair competition filed by the
Federal Trade Commission. See Complaint, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003 (F.T.C.
Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-3003/mphjtechnology-investments-llc-matter [hereinafter FTC Complaint].
2
Id. exhibit A, at 1.
3
Id. at 4. Some versions of the letter stated the price as $1,000 per employee. FTC Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 30, at 7.
4
Id. exhibit B, at 1.
5
Id. exhibit C, at 1.
6
See id.
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It turns out that CleOrv, DucPla, EntNil, and the other companies asserting patent infringement are all subsidiaries of another company,
MPHJ Technology Investments, which is controlled by a Texas lawyer
named Jay Mac Rust. 7 Patent holders such as MPHJ have been called
“bottom feeder” patent trolls: They assert patents against numerous potential infringers, relying on the high cost of threatened litigation to extract quick settlements. 8 Notably, bottom feeder trolls such as MPHJ
have begun to target not the manufacturers of allegedly infringing technology, but the businesses, organizations, and individuals who are the
end users of that technology. 9 For instance, patent trolls have sent letters
to thousands of hotels and restaurants, claiming that those businesses
committed patent infringement by using wireless technology to make Internet service available to their customers. 10 Another patent troll sent letters to numerous construction companies claiming infringement of a patent on the use of a “moisture removal system”—that is, a fan—to dry
lumber during construction. 11
These enforcement campaigns are troubling because, if the patents are
as broad as their owners claim, they may be invalid due to the Patent
Act’s requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. 12 Yet the nature of
7

See Agreement Containing Consent Order ¶ 2, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003
(F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/14110
6mphjagree.pdf.
8
See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2126 (2013). There are, of course, terms other than the pejorative “patent troll” that are used to refer to entities that exist primarily to assert patents and that do not
manufacture a product or provide services, including “non-practicing entity” (“NPE”) and
“patent assertion entity” (“PAE”). For an overview of the terminology and a discussion of
potential differences in meaning among the terms, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 425,
426 (2014); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 Minn. L. Rev. 649, 667–70 (2014) (dividing patentholder litigants into eight different categories).
9
See Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1443,
1456 (2014).
10
See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
11
Letter from Jon Chandler, Or. Home Builders Ass’n, to Senate Comm. on Judiciary (Feb.
12, 2014), available at https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2014R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDo
cument/33881.
12
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). Indeed, several claims of MPHJ’s patents have been
invalidated in post-issuance review proceedings at the Patent and Trademark Office. See,
e.g., Ricoh Ams. Corp. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. IPR2013-302 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19,
2014); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. IPR2013-309 (P.T.A.B. Nov.
19, 2014).
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the enforcement behavior is also disturbing. Many demand letters are
sent to entities, such as nonprofits, municipal governments, and small
businesses that are unfamiliar with patent litigation 13 and that may find it
too costly to investigate the merit of the patent claims or to fight the infringement allegations. 14 Indeed, the letters sent by bottom feeders are
designed to intimidate the recipient into quickly purchasing a license.
MPHJ’s lawyers, for example, threatened to file suit unless the recipient
responded within two weeks. 15 But those threats often are deceptive or
false. MPHJ, for instance, did not file a single infringement suit for several months after the final letters were sent, suggesting that it never intended to litigate at all. 16 When MPHJ finally did file suit, it did so only
after numerous state attorneys general had begun investigating the company’s enforcement tactics. 17
In response to these campaigns, legislatures in over half the states
have passed statutes outlawing certain acts of patent enforcement.18 In a
majority of those states, the new laws are modeled after a statute first
adopted in Vermont, which prohibits “bad faith” assertions of patent infringement. 19 Other states have outlawed assertions that “contain false,
misleading, or deceptive information” 20 or have defined specific acts as
illegal, such as making infringement assertions that “lack a reasonable
basis in fact or law” or failing to provide, in a letter alleging patent in13
See Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En
Masse for Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 235, 235 (2014).
14
See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387, 400 (2014) (noting that NPE litigation is relatively more costly for small
firms than for larger firms).
15
See FTC Complaint, supra note 1, exhibit C, at 1.
16
Complaint exhibit F, at 12, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 13, 2014) (excerpting FTC draft complaint against MPHJ), available at http://cdn.
arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/FTC-MPHJ.draf_.complaint.pdf.
17
See infra Section I.B (discussing state attorney general investigations). Moreover, MPHJ
did not sue the small businesses it targeted in the demand letter campaign; it sued large companies such as Coca-Cola, the insurance company Unum Group, and the department store
chain Dillard’s. Ryan Davis, “Patent Troll” Targets Coca-Cola amid Probe by AGs, Law360
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/498845.
18
As of June 2015, twenty-seven states had passed statutes regulating patent enforcement
conduct. Those states are: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra Section I.A (summarizing the
statutes).
19
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2014).
20
Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(b) (2014).
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fringement, “factual allegations” about how, exactly, the recipient infringes the patent. 21 Most of the new statutes create a private right of action for the targets of unlawful infringement assertions and all of the
statutes allow for enforcement by state officials, such as the state attorney general. 22 In addition, state attorneys general have begun to use
long-existing state laws, such as consumer protection statutes and deceptive trade practices laws, to challenge schemes of patent enforcement.23
Although patents are usually thought to be the domain of the federal
government alone, 24 Congress has only recently begun to consider bills
that would outlaw unfair or deceptive patent demand letters. 25 The
states’ growing role in the patent system is reflected on the website of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which counsels persons who receive demand letters that are “deceptive, predatory, or in bad faith” to,
among other things, “fil[e] a complaint with your state attorney general’s office.” 26 The states, by taking aggressive steps to regulate patent
enforcement, are thus poised to erode the federal government’s monopoly over the patent system.
Doctrines of federal constitutional law, however, may invalidate the
new state statutes and limit the law enforcement authority of state officials. For decades, businesses and individuals accused of patent infringement have tried to assert state law tort claims against overzealous
patent holders, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, 27 has held
that those claims are mostly preempted by the federal Patent Act. According to the Federal Circuit, to avoid preemption, the accused infringer must prove not only the elements of its state law claim, it must also
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the patent holder’s infringement allegations were “objectively baseless,” meaning that no reasonable litigant could have expected to succeed, and (2) that the patent
holder made its infringement allegations with knowledge of their inaccu-

21

See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-10-102(a)(3) (2014).
See infra notes 84–86, 107, 121 and accompanying text.
23
See infra Section I.B.
24
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 12.
25
See infra Section IV.C.
26
I Got a Letter . . . , U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Jan. 30, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/litigation/I_got_a_letter.jsp.
27
See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 Geo. L.J.
1437, 1441–42 (2012).
22
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racy or with reckless disregard for their accuracy. 28 Cases challenging
the constitutionality of the new state statutes and state law enforcement
actions are just getting underway. 29 But the Federal Circuit’s two-part
test will almost certainly prohibit the states from condemning any but
the most frivolous assertions of patent infringement. 30 This Article argues, however, that the Federal Circuit’s preemption rule is wrong as a
matter of doctrine, is misguided as a matter of policy, and ignores important lessons from the history of patent enforcement.
As a matter of doctrine, courts usually identify the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause as the source of preemption law, 31 and the Federal Circuit has sometimes invoked the Supremacy Clause as grounds for immunizing acts of patent enforcement from state law liability. 32 A closer
examination of Federal Circuit case law, however, reveals that the most
significant constitutional barrier to state regulation of patent enforcement is not preemption pursuant to the Supremacy Clause; it is the Federal Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause. 33
Under an orthodox, Supremacy Clause-based preemption analysis,
state laws regulating patent enforcement likely avoid preemption. Although the state laws create some disuniformity in the patent system,
they arguably do not conflict with the core objectives of federal patent
28
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
29
See MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC v. Sorrell, No. 2:14-cv-191, 2015 WL 3505224, at *9 (D.
Vt. June 3, 2015) (denying the state’s motion to dismiss in a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Vermont statute is unconstitutional).
30
For commentary raising the possibility that the pathmarking Vermont statute is
preempted, see David Lee Johnson, Note, Facing Down the Trolls: States Stumble on the
Bridge to Patent-Assertion Regulation, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2023, 2027 (2014); Adam
Smith, Note, Patent Trolls—An Overview of Proposed Legislation and a Solution That Benefits Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs, 9 Ohio St. Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 201, 223
(2014); Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent Trolling Law, Forbes
(May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermontenacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law.
31
See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); see also U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
32
See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
33
The Petition Clause protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
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law, such as incentivizing invention and inducing the disclosure of inventions. 34 And it is difficult to say that federal law fully occupies the
field of patent-enforcement regulation: The Patent Act is entirely silent
on the issue of unfair or deceptive enforcement—it neither condemns
nor immunizes it. 35 Moreover, courts have consistently refused to find
field preemption of state law tort claims that impose liability on patent
holders. 36 Rather than analyzing preemption under the Supremacy
Clause, however, the Federal Circuit has imported as its preemption test
the nearly insurmountable requirements imposed by the Supreme Court
on plaintiffs who seek to inflict antitrust liability on defendants based on
those defendants’ pursuit of litigation. 37 This doctrine, often called the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine (or Noerr doctrine, for short), 38 stems from
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal antitrust statute, the
Sherman Act, in the light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. 39
To strip an antitrust defendant of the immunity conferred by the
Noerr doctrine, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s underlying
lawsuit was a “sham” by proving both that the lawsuit was objectively
baseless and that it was filed with the subjective intent to impair competition. 40 The Federal Circuit, in adopting as its preemption rule the same
requirements of objective baselessness and subjective bad intent, has
thus expanded Noerr immunity by allowing patent holders to invoke the
doctrine to avoid any type of civil liability, not just liability under the
antitrust laws, based on any conduct related to patent enforcement, not
just the pursuit of litigation. 41 This expansion of Noerr immunity is a
mistake. Letters sent from one private party to another, such as letters
threatening patent infringement litigation, are not “petition[s]” to “the
government” within the meaning of the First Amendment. Moreover, the
34

See infra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 165–72 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
37
See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
38
The doctrine’s name stems from the cases in which the Supreme Court first developed
it. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
39
See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990).
40
See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–
61 (1993).
41
See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1376. The Federal Circuit, it should be noted, is not alone
among the federal courts in applying Noerr beyond its original context. See infra text accompanying notes 193–200.
35
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Federal Circuit’s use of Noerr as a preemption rule gets the federalism
analysis exactly backwards. The Supreme Court has often articulated a
presumption against preemption, 42 but the Federal Circuit insists that a
patent holder seeking to avoid preemption “has a heavy burden to carry.” 43
The Federal Circuit’s erroneous expansion of Noerr immunity is not
only wrong as a matter of doctrine, it also has several destructive policy
implications. For instance, it grants patent holders a license to lie in their
demand letters, so long as those letters also contain objectively plausible
allegations of infringement. Thus, patent holders can lawfully send letters stating that many recipients have already purchased licenses to the
asserted patents even if, in fact, few if any recipients have done so. 44
And patent holders can lawfully claim that the validity of the asserted
patents have been upheld in court or in reexamination at the Patent and
Trademark Office, even if that is not true. 45 In addition, because the
Federal Circuit purports to derive its Noerr-based immunity standard
from the First Amendment, 46 that standard makes it unconstitutional for
not just states but also the federal government to condemn any but the
most fantastical allegations of patent infringement. Thus, although the
President, members of Congress, and the Federal Trade Commission
have all recently voiced concerns about “patent trolls,” 47 Federal Circuit
law significantly limits the regulatory options.
Fortunately, history provides a useful lesson on how courts can strike
an appropriate balance between protecting patent holders from liability
when they make legitimate allegations of infringement and punishing
patent holders when they engage in unfair or deceptive enforcement tactics. Specifically, a long line of federal judicial decisions—which the
Federal Circuit has mostly ignored—addresses the precise question of
when a patent holder may be held liable for its enforcement conduct. As
42

See, e.g., Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008).
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
44
See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 920–21 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
45
See id.
46
See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377.
47
See, e.g., Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. Mike Lee, America’s Patent Problem, Politico
(Sept. 15, 2013, 9:25 PM), http://politi.co/16vXntz; Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Votes for Inquiry
Into Patent Businesses, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/09/28/business/ftc-targets-patent-companies.html; Edward Wyatt, Obama
Orders Regulators to Root Out “Patent Trolls,” N.Y. Times, June 4, 2013, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.html.
43
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early as the nineteenth century, courts sitting in equity enjoined patent
holders from making infringement assertions in bad faith, which could
be established through evidence of the patent holder’s “malicious intent.” 48 Although a patent holder’s intent is a subjective question, courts
often inferred subjective intent from objective evidence, such as the patent holder’s threatening a large number of accused infringers 49 and the
patent holder’s failure to follow its threats with actual lawsuits. 50 This
flexible, equity-based immunity standard—as opposed to the rigid twopart test mandated by the Federal Circuit—would empower all three
branches of government at both the state and federal levels to impose
reasonable restrictions on patent enforcement. At the same time, cases in
which enforcement conduct was enjoined under the traditional standard
were usually egregious and often involved claims that were objectively
weak on the merits, 51 so a revitalized good faith immunity doctrine
would protect patent holders’ ability to provide legitimate notice of their
patent rights.
This Article is the first to consider whether the new state statutes are
constitutional. 52 By showing how current Federal Circuit doctrine could
48

E.g., Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 50–51 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
E.g., Int’l Indus. & Devs., v. Farbach Chem. Co., 241 F.2d 246, 247–48 (6th Cir. 1957).
50
E.g., Adriance, Platt & Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 121 F. 827, 829–30 (2d Cir. 1903).
51
E.g., Emack, 34 F. at 49.
52
A few recent student notes have reached conflicting conclusions about whether Vermont’s new statute survives under the Federal Circuit’s Noerr-based “preemption” law.
Compare Johnson, supra note 30, at 2028 (arguing that “much of [Vermont’s] law is likely
dead letter”), with Ryan DeSisto, Note, Vermont vs. the Patent Troll: Is State Action a
Bridge Too Far?, 48 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 109, 126–27 (2015) (noting that the Vermont statute
“successfully dodges intrusion upon Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction,” but that the “objective baselessness” requirement renders the statute “impotent in the great bulk of patenttrolling cases”), and T. Christian Landreth, Recent Development, The Fight Against “Patent
Trolls:” Will State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & Tech. Online 100, 120 (2014),
http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Landreth_final.pdf (arguing that “Vermont has
tailored its statute sufficiently to comply with” Federal Circuit law). Those pieces do not,
however, engage the underlying question of whether Noerr provides the correct test for the
constitutional validity of laws regulating patent enforcement, nor do they address the implications of current Federal Circuit doctrine for the federal government’s efforts to fight unfair
or deceptive conduct in patent enforcement. Although few commentators have analyzed the
constitutionality of state laws governing patent enforcement, there is a rich literature examining federal preemption of state laws that create intellectual property rights, such as the law of
trade secrets, and state laws that have the potential to alter the scope of federal intellectual
property rights, such as the law of contracts. As a small sample, see Dan L. Burk, Protection
of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 560, 562–63 (1993); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive
Effect, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 265, 266 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh
49
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quash those innovative reforms, and by offering an alternative to the
Federal Circuit’s onerous Noerr-based immunity rule, this Article contributes to an important and on-going policy conversation as additional
states, as well as the federal government, contemplate steps to fight abusive patent enforcement. 53
This Article will begin in Part I by outlining the state laws relevant to
patent enforcement, including the new state statutes. Part II will then explore the bodies of federal law that potentially nullify those state laws,
namely, preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause and doctrines
of petitioning immunity derived from the First Amendment. Part III will
reexamine the relevant Federal Circuit case law, showing that the key
limit on the states’ ability to regulate patent enforcement is not preemption but the Federal Circuit’s flawed interpretation of the First Amendment. Part IV will explore the practical consequences of conferring
broad immunity on patent holders’ assertions of infringement, highlighting the limited power that both state governments and the federal government have under Federal Circuit law. Finally, Part V will outline
ways in which Federal Circuit law should be reformed to provide governments the ability to outlaw unfair and deceptive schemes of patent
enforcement.
I. PATENT ENFORCEMENT AND STATE LAW
Although the substance of patent law is exclusively federal, 54 state
law is relevant to patents in several areas. Perhaps most notably, owner-

ed., 2013); Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 Iowa L. Rev. 959, 961 (1991); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1999); Maureen A.
O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption
of Software License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479, 479 (1995); Joan E. Schaffner, Patent
Preemption Unlocked, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1081, 1082–83.
53
For regularly updated lists of state legislative actions, see 2015 Patent Trolling Legislation, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financialservices-and-commerce/2015-patent-trolling-legislation.aspx (last visited June 19, 2015);
Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, Patent Progress, http://www.patent
progress.org/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation (last visited June 19, 2015). For
a discussion of proposed federal legislation and potential federal law enforcement actions,
see infra Section IV.C.
54
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez
Faire, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 45, 47 (2013) (“Today patent law is purely a federal creature.”).
But cf. Camilla A. Hrdy, Dissenting State Patent Regimes, 3 IP Theory 78, 89 (2013),
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ship of a patent is determined by state law. 55 For example, agreements to
assign or license a patent are generally governed by state contract law,56
state family law determines who owns a patent after divorce, 57 and state
probate law determines who owns a patent after its owner dies. 58 In addition, and of most relevance to this Article, activities that patent holders
undertake in the process of enforcing their patents may expose them to
civil liability under state law.
The enforcement activities that can expose a patent holder to liability include filing and pursuing infringement litigation in court, threatening an accused infringer with an infringement suit, and communicating allegations of infringement to third parties, such as the accused
infringer’s customers. In those scenarios, the target of the infringement
allegations may seek relief under various bodies of state law including
unfair competition, 59 interference with contract or prospective business
advantage, 60 abuse of process, 61 business disparagement, 62 and anti-

http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol3/iss2/2 (suggesting that state governments retain
the power to issue patents).
55
The separate issue of inventorship is governed by federal law. See Univ. of Colo.
Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Patent Act
requires a patent application to be filed in the names of the natural person or persons who
were the actual inventors. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Although the inventors, by default,
own the patent, ownership can be transferred by contract, and those contracts are usually
governed by state law. See 8 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 22.02 (2009).
56
See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For
commentary criticizing how the Federal Circuit has applied this rule in practice, see Shubha
Ghosh, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law Jurisprudence
and IP Federalism, 96 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 536, 551 (2014) (arguing that “[w]hen
contract issues intersect with patent law in areas such as licensing and assignments . . . the
Federal Circuit has used its jurisdiction over patent claims to create a body of contract doctrine that is divorced from state law”).
57
See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
58
See, e.g., Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1557–58 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
59
See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1998). As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, “the term ‘unfair competition’ . . . describes an array of legal actions addressing methods of competition that improperly interfere with the legitimate commercial interests of other sellers in the marketplace,” including “passing off, deceptive advertising, and the infringement of trademarks,
trade secrets, and publicity rights.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, at xi (1995).
60
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
61
See, e.g., Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
62
See, e.g., Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476,
478 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Disparagement sometimes goes by the names of injurious falsehood or
trade libel. See Black’s Law Dictionary 570 (10th ed. 2014).
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trust, 63 among others. The target of infringement allegations can also
pursue claims under federal law, including antitrust claims under the
Sherman Act, 64 unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act, 65 and
even claims under the civil RICO statute. 66
There is a long history of parties accused of infringement suing or
counterclaiming against the patent holder to challenge the veracity of or
motivation behind the infringement allegations. 67 In the past few years,
however, as the term “patent troll” entered the vernacular 68 and patent
holders such as MPHJ began to target end users of patented technology,
legislatures in several states have adopted new statutes to deter and punish certain acts of patent enforcement, and state law enforcement officials have also become involved in patent disputes.
A. New State Statutes
Statutes outlawing particular acts of patent enforcement are actually
nothing new. In 1883, the British Parliament created a so-called threats
action—a civil claim that could be pursued by persons targeted with
groundless threats of suit for patent infringement. 69 The U.S. patent
laws, however, have never provided such a claim. Rather, the statute
passed in Vermont in May 2013 was the first statute in the United States
to specifically condemn acts of patent enforcement.
Vermont’s statute seems, by all accounts, to have been the product of
a grassroots effort by businesses and nonprofits in the state who had re63

See, e.g., Eon Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.
Mass. 2003).
64
See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
65
See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
66
See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (also involving claims under a state RICO statute).
67
For an early example of an antitrust claim based on patent enforcement conducted “maliciously and without probable cause,” see Virtue v. Creamery Package Manufacturing Co.,
227 U.S. 8, 29 (1913), in which the plaintiffs alleged that their “business was destroyed by
defendants wrongfully prosecuting two suits against them for the infringement of patents . . . and by circulating slanders and libels to the effect that [the plaintiffs’] articles were
infringements of defendants’ patents.” Id. at 24.
68
See, e.g., GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-cv-2885, slip. op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. June 24,
2014) (Koh, J.) (pre-trial order prohibiting Apple from referring to the plaintiff as, among
other things, a “patent troll,” “pirate,” “bounty hunter,” “privateer,” “bandit,” or “corporate
shell”).
69
See The Law Commission, Patents, Trade Marks and Design Rights: Groundless
Threats, 2014, at 13 (U.K.).
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ceived demand letters from bottom feeders such as MPHJ. 70 Those organizations, working with the state’s legislators and attorney general,
crafted a statute that has served as a model for several other states. 71
The core provision of the Vermont statute states, simply: “A person
shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.” 72 The statute then lists several factors that courts “may consider . . . as evidence
that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement,” 73
including:
• The demand letter 74 does not contain the patent number, the name
and address of the patent holder, and “factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target’s products, services, and
technology infringe the patent.” 75

70
See Kristopher A. Boushie et al., The Great Patent Troll Debate—2 Perspectives: Part I,
Law360 (May 13, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/533838/the-great-patent-troll-debate2-perspectives-part-1.
71
See Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont Could Save the Nation from Patent Trolls, Wash.
Post The Switch (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/
08/01/how-vermont-could-save-the-nation-from-patent-trolls (last visited Aug. 14, 2015).
The states that have followed Vermont’s model include Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See Ala. Code §§ 354-400 to -406 (LexisNexis 2014); 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1263–68 (to be codified at Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 6-12-101 to -104); H.B. 439, 2015 Leg., at 1–12 (Fla. 2015) (enacted) (to be
codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 501.991–97); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-770 to -774 (2014); Idaho
Code Ann. §§ 48-1701 to -1708 (2014); 2015 Ind. Acts 1845–49 (to be codified at Ind. Code
§§ 24-11-1-1 to 24-11-5-2); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1428 (2015); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14,
§§ 8701–02 (2014); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 11-1601 to -1605 (LexisNexis 2014);
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 416.650–58 (2014); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 359-M:1 to -M:5 (LexisNexis
2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-140 to -145 (West 2014); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-36-01 to
-08 (2015); 2014 Or. Laws 2545; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-36-1 to -9 (2014); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78B-6-1901 to -1905 (LexisNexis 2014); Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-215.1 to .4 (2014);
S. 5059, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (enacted).
72
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2014).
73
Id. § 4197(b).
74
The statute defines “demand letter” as “a letter, e-mail, or other communication asserting or claiming that the target has engaged in patent infringement.” Id. § 4196(1). The statute
defines “target” as a person “who has received a demand letter or against whom an assertion
or allegation of patent infringement has been made,” “who has been threatened with litigation or against whom a lawsuit has been filed alleging patent infringement,” or “whose customers have received a demand letter asserting that the person’s product, service, or technology has infringed a patent.” Id. § 4196(2).
75
Id. § 4197(b)(1).
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• The demand letter lacks the information noted above, the target requests the information, and the patent holder fails to provide the information “within a reasonable period of time.” 76
• The patent holder has previously filed or threatened to file one or
more similar patent infringement lawsuits and those threats lacked
the information noted above or were found by a court to be meritless. 77
• Prior to sending the demand letter, the patent holder did not conduct
an analysis comparing the claims of the patent to the target’s products, services, or technology, “or such an analysis was done but
does not identify specific areas in which the products, services, and
technology are covered by the claims in the patent.” 78
• The demand letter demands payment of a license or a response
“within an unreasonably short period of time.” 79
• The patent holder “offers to license the patent for an amount that is
not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”80
• “The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the
person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is
meritless.” 81
• “The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.” 82

76

Id. § 4197(b)(3).
Id. § 4197(b)(8).
78
Id. § 4197(b)(2).
79
Id. § 4197(b)(4).
80
Id. § 4197(b)(5).
81
Id. § 4197(b)(6).
82
Id. § 4197(b)(7). The statute also lists several factors that courts “may consider . . . as
evidence that a person has not made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.” Id.
§ 4197(c) (emphasis added). Several of the factors are simply the opposite of the factors indicating bad faith. E.g., id. § 4197(c)(6) (“The person has demonstrated good faith business
practices in previous efforts to enforce the patent . . . or successfully enforced the patent . . . through litigation.”). Other factors, however, identify specific categories of patent
holders for special treatment, making clear the statute’s aim at non-practicing entities, e.g.,
id. § 4197(c)(4) (indicative of good faith if the sender “makes a substantial investment in the
use of the patent or in the production or sale of a product or item covered by the patent”),
and the political power of certain patent owners, e.g., id. § 4197(c)(5)(B) (indicative of good
faith if the sender “is an institution of higher education or a technology transfer organization
owned or affiliated with an institution of higher education”).
77
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By instructing courts to determine bad faith by referencing factors that
are both objective (for example, that the claim of infringement was meritless) and subjective (for example, that the patent holder knew the claim
of infringement was meritless), Vermont has tried to accommodate the
Federal Circuit’s Noerr-based immunity standard. As discussed in more
detail below, however, certain applications of the statute may still be unconstitutional under current Federal Circuit law. 83
In terms of enforcement, the Vermont statute empowers the state attorney general to instigate both civil investigations and civil actions in
court. 84 The statute also creates a private right of action for the target of
a bad faith assertion of patent infringement. 85 In that private action, a
successful plaintiff may obtain equitable relief, damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and “exemplary damages” of $50,000 or “three times the
total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is greater.” 86 In September
2013, the influential Council of State Governments approved Vermont’s
statute to be included in its compilation of suggested state legislation. 87
Although over a dozen states have mimicked Vermont’s statute by
outlawing bad faith assertions of patent infringement, 88 there are some
differences among the statutes adopted in those states. For instance,
some states have not created a private right of action, limiting enforcement power to state officials, such as the attorney general. 89 Also, not all
states explicitly permit plaintiffs to recover exemplary or punitive damages. 90 A few statutes outlaw only bad faith assertions made against end

83

See infra Section IV.B.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4199(a).
85
Id. § 4199(b).
86
Id.
87
Comm. on Suggested State Legislation Docket 35A, Council of State Gov’ts, Minutes at 5
(Sept. 19–20, 2013), http://www.csg.org/programs/policyprograms/documents/MeetingMinutesDocket35AKansasCity.pdf.
88
See supra note 71 (listing the states).
89
See, e.g., 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1266 (to be codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-12-104(1));
La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1428(C)(1) (2015); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-215.3.E (2014); S. 5059, 64th
Leg., Reg. Sess. ch. 108, § 4 (Wash. 2015) (enacted).
90
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-M:4.II (LexisNexis 2014) (providing that a plaintiff may
obtain equitable relief, damages, and costs and fees, including reasonable attorneys’ fees);
see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 416.654 (2014) (permitting recovery of actual damages or $10,000
for each violation, whichever is greater, plus attorneys’ fees).
84
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users 91 and other statutes prohibit bad faith assertions only when they
are made by nonpracticing entities. 92
For the purpose of this Article, the most important differences among
the statutes involve the conduct that can provide evidence of bad faith.
Some statutes, in tension with the Federal Circuit’s requirement that a
plaintiff challenging patent enforcement conduct must show both objective baselessness and the patent holder’s improper subjective intent,
grant courts leeway to find bad faith based solely on subjective considerations. The Virginia and Idaho statutes, for instance, indicate that a
finding of bad faith may be warranted if an infringement assertion is
made “in subjective bad faith” or “a reasonable actor in the [patent holder’s] position would know or reasonably should know that [the] assertion is baseless.” 93 The Virginia statute also suggests that a finding of
bad faith may be appropriate if “the person threatens legal action
that . . . is not intended to be taken.” 94 Current Federal Circuit doctrine
plainly prohibits a state from imposing liability based solely on the patent holder’s subjective intent, as seems to be possible under the Idaho
and Virginia statutes. 95
In addition to the Vermont-style statutes outlawing bad faith assertions of infringement, there are two other legislative models for regulating patent enforcement: one passed only in Wisconsin, which outlines in
detail the information that a demand letter must contain and outlaws
false and deceptive assertions of infringement, and another passed in
91

See La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1428(A)(2), (B)(1) (defining “end-user” as “a consumer, whether an individual, business, or financial institution, who purchases, rents, leases, or otherwise
obtains a product, service, or technology in the commercial market that is not for resale and
is, or later becomes, the subject of a patent infringement assertion”); accord 2015 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1264–65 (to be codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-12-101(2), 6-12-102(1)).
92
See 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1266 (to be codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-12-103(2)(a)); N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-142(5), -143(c)(4) (2014); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-36-08(2) (2015).
93
Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-215.2.B.5 (2014); accord Idaho Code Ann. § 48-1703(f) (2014).
Interestingly, the Missouri statute entirely omits the Vermont factor of whether the assertion
was meritless and known to be meritless, instead indicating that a finding of bad faith may
be appropriate on the (circular) basis of previous court rulings of bad faith enforcement. See
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 416.652.2(5)–(6) (listing as factors indicating bad faith: (1) the patent holder “previously presented a demand letter claiming or asserting patent infringement of the
same patent under substantially the same circumstances, and a court has entered a final
judgment that the demand letter presented a bad faith assertion of patent infringement” and
(2) the patent holder “attempted to enforce the claim of patent infringement in litigation, and
a court found the claim to be brought in bad faith”).
94
Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-215.2.B.6.
95
See infra Section IV.B.
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several other states, which lists specific acts of patent enforcement that
are illegal.
In April 2014, Wisconsin became the third state, after Vermont and
Oregon, to pass a statute regulating patent enforcement. 96 Wisconsin’s
statute requires any “patent notification” 97 to contain several pieces of
information, including:
• The number of each patent asserted. 98
• Copies of those patents. 99
• The name and address of the patent owner and all persons who have
a right to enforce the patent. 100
• An identification of each claim of each patent being asserted and of
“the target’s product, service, process, or technology to which that
claim relates.” 101
• “Factual allegations and an analysis setting forth in detail the person’s theory of each claim identified . . . and how that claim relates
to the target’s product, service, process, or technology.” 102
• “An identification of each pending or completed court or administrative proceeding . . . concerning each patent” asserted. 103

The Wisconsin statute can be violated in two ways. First, if a patent
notification lacks any of the required information, the target may notify
the sender that the notification is incomplete. 104 If the sender does not
provide the missing information within thirty days, the sender violates
the statute. 105 In addition, a patent notification violates the Wisconsin
statute if it “contain[s] false, misleading, or deceptive information.” 106
96
Like the Vermont statute, Oregon’s statute, which passed in March 2014, outlaws “bad
faith” assertions of infringement. See 2014 Or. Laws 2545.
97
The statute defines “patent notification” as “a letter, e-mail, or other written communication attempting in any manner to enforce or assert rights in connection with a patent or pending patent.” Wis. Stat. § 100.197(1)(a) (2014).
98
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(1).
99
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(2).
100
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(3).
101
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(4).
102
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(5).
103
Id. § 100.197(2)(a)(6).
104
Id. § 100.197(2)(c)(1).
105
Id. § 100.197(2)(c)(2).
106
Id. § 100.197(2)(b).
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As discussed in more detail below, the Wisconsin statute is vulnerable to
a constitutional challenge because it condemns allegations of infringement that are merely false, not objectively baseless, and because it
would condemn letters that omit some piece of required information but
that contain otherwise accurate infringement allegations. 107
A third and final model of legislation has been adopted in about a
half-dozen states, beginning with Tennessee in May 2014. 108 These statutes apply only to demand letters sent to end users, 109 and most of the
statutes apply only to letters sent by nonpracticing entities. 110 The statutes outline four specific types of unlawful patent assertions. 111 First, a
patent demand letter violates the statute if it “falsely states that litigation
has been filed” against the recipient. 112 Second, a patent holder violates
107
See infra Section IV.B. The Wisconsin statute provides remedies similar to those available under the Vermont statute. Specifically, the state attorney general may investigate violations and may sue to enjoin false, misleading, or deceptive patent notifications and to compel
a sender to provide the information required by the statute. Wis. Stat. § 100.197(3)(a)(2). In
addition, any person injured by a violation of the statute may pursue a civil action. Id.
§ 100.197(3)(b).
108
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-10-101 to -104 (2014). In addition to Tennessee, states adopting this model include Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas. See
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(a)–(b) (2015); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 920; H.B. 589, Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2015) (enacted); S.B. 39, 64th Leg. (Mont. 2015) (enacted); Okla. Stat. tit. 23,
§§ 111–14 (2014); S.B. 1457, 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (enacted) (to be codified at Tex. Bus.
& Com. Code §§ 17.951–55).
109
See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(a)–(b) (stating that the statute applies only to communications sent to “a person who purchases, rents, leases, or otherwise obtains a product or
service in the commercial market that is not for resale in the commercial market”); accord
Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 111(2), 112(A); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-10-101(2), -102(a); Tex. S.B.
1457 at 1 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.951, 17.952(a)); 2015 Kan.
Sess. Laws 920; Miss. H.B. 589 §§ 1(b), 2(1); Mont. S.B. 39 §§ 1(2), 2(1).
110
See Miss. H.B. 589 §§ 1(b), 2(3)(a) (stating that the statute does not apply to communications sent by “[a]ny owner of a patent who is using the patent in connection with substantial research, development, production, manufacturing, processing or delivery of products or
materials”); accord Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(C)(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-10-102(c)(1);
2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 921; Mont. S.B. 39 § 2(3)(a).
111
Like the Vermont statute, the Kansas and Texas statutes outlaw “bad faith” assertions
of patent infringement. Tex. S.B. 1457, at 1 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 17.952(a)); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 920. However, I have classified those statutes as falling
into this third category because, rather than providing a variety of factors for courts to consider in determining bad faith, the Kansas and Texas statutes provide an exclusive list of
scenarios in which patent enforcement is, under the statute, deemed to be in bad faith, see
Tex. S.B. 1457, at 1–2 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.952(b)); 2015 Kan.
Sess. Laws 920–21, and that list resembles the specific prohibitions found in this third category of statutes.
112
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(2); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(A)(2); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-10-102(a)(2); Tex. S.B. 1457, at 1 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
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the statute if the assertions in the demand letter “lack a reasonable basis
in fact or law because” one of three things is true: (1) the person asserting the patent does not have the right to enforce it; (2) the demand letter
is seeking compensation for a patent that has been held invalid or unenforceable; or (3) the demand letter seeks compensation for activities undertaken after the patent has expired. 113 Third, a demand letter violates
the statute if it does not identify the person asserting the patent, identify
the patent itself, or contain “factual allegations concerning the specific
areas in which the [recipient’s] products, services, or technology infringe[] the patent.” 114 Finally, the statutes passed in Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee are violated if the demand letter “threatens litigation if compensation is not paid or the infringement issue is not
otherwise resolved and there is a consistent pattern of such threats having been issued and no litigation having been filed.” 115 Statutes passed in
Illinois and Montana, by contrast, do not require a pattern of false
threats, making it unlawful for any demand letter to “falsely threaten[]”
litigation “if compensation is not paid or the infringement issue is not
otherwise resolved.” 116
The statutes also specify patent enforcement conduct that is not unlawful. Patent holders are explicitly allowed (1) to “advise others of
[their] ownership” of the patent, (2) to “communicate to others that the
patent is available for license or sale,” (3) to “notify another of the infringement of the patent,” and (4) to “seek compensation on account of

§ 17.952(b)(1)); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 921; Miss. H.B. 589 § 2(1)(b); Mont. S.B. 39
§ 2(1)(a).
113
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(3); Okla. Stat. tit. 23 § 112(A)(3); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-10-102(a)(3); Tex. S.B. 1457, at 1–2 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 17.952(b)(2)); Miss. H.B. 589 § 2(1)(c)(i)–(iii); Mont. S.B. 39 § 2(1)(b)(i)–(iii). The Kansas statute omits the first of these three grounds for finding a violation. 2015 Kan. Sess.
Laws 921.
114
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(4)(B); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(A)(3)(d); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-10-102(a)(3)(D); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 920; Miss. H.B. 589 § 2(1)(c)(iv); Mont.
S.B. 39 § 2(1)(iv). Rather than requiring factual allegations about how the recipient infringes, the Texas statute requires the letter to identify “at least one product, service, or technology” that infringes the patent, or “the activity” of the recipient that infringes the patent. Tex.
S.B. 1457, at 2 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.952(b)(3)(C)).
115
Okla. Stat. tit. 23 § 112(A)(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-10-102(a)(1); Miss. H.B. 589
§ 2(1)(a).
116
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(1); accord Mont. S.B. 39 § 2(1)(a). Besides outlawing letters that falsely state that litigation has been filed, see supra note 112, the Kansas and
Texas statutes do not address false threats of litigation. 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 920-22; Tex.
S.B. 1457, at 1–4 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.951–55).
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past or present infringement.” 117 At first glance, these exceptions appear
to immunize the very conduct the statutes earlier deem unlawful. Practically all demand letters would seem to fall within the exceptions that allow patent holders to “notify” others “of the infringement” and to “seek
compensation” for infringement. The Oklahoma statute appears to avoid
this contradiction by stating that the exceptions apply only if the patent
holder “is not acting in bad faith.” 118 But other states’ statutes apply a
“bad faith” requirement only to the exception that allows patent holders
to “seek compensation” for infringement. 119 And the Illinois statute
omits the bad faith requirement altogether. 120 Courts considering claims
under these statutes will be forced to confront difficult questions about
how these seemingly broad exceptions interact with the statute’s explicit
prohibitions. 121
In sum, although the state statutes vary somewhat, they share common aims: ensuring that patent holders’ demand letters provide accused
infringers with specific information about the alleged infringement and

117

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(c); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(B); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2910-102(b); Miss. H.B. 589 § 2(2); Mont. S.B. 39 § 2(2); accord Tex. S.B. 1457, at 3 (to be
codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.954(3)). The Kansas statute takes a slightly different tack, listing several situations in which the statute is not violated, including when, among
other things, the patent holder “has, as the owner of the patent and in good faith, sought
compensation . . . from the [recipient] by reason of infringement of its patent,” the patent
holder “has demonstrated good faith business practices in previous efforts to enforce the patent or a substantially similar patent,” and the patent holder “has, as the owner of the patent
and in good faith, communicated to any person that its patent is available for license or sale.”
2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 921.
118
Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(B).
119
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-10-102(b)(4); Miss. H.B. 589 § 2(2)(d); Mont. S.B. 39
§ 2(2)(d).
120
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(c). The Texas statute likewise does not apply a bad faith
requirement to the portion of the statue describing the conduct that is not unlawful. Tex. S.B.
1457, at 3 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.954(3)).
121
Most of the statutes following this third model may, like the Vermont and Wisconsin
statutes, be enforced by the state attorney general and through a civil action. See 815 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 505/7, 505/10a; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-10-103 to -104; Miss. H.B. 589 §§ 3–4;
Mont. S.B. 39 § 3; see also Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-632(a), 50-634(b), 50-636(a) (2014)
(providing that the attorney general and private parties may file suit to enforce the state’s
consumer protection laws, of which Kansas’s patent enforcement statute is a part); Okla.
Stat. tit. 23, § 114 (not expressly creating a private right of action for violations of Oklahoma’s patent enforcement statute, but stating that the court may award compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages “to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought
pursuant to this act”). But see Tex. S.B. 1457, at 3 (to be codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 17.955) (“This subchapter does not create a private cause of action . . . .”).
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deterring patent holders from engaging in unfair or deceptive conduct in
the hope of eliciting nuisance-value settlements.
B. State Law Enforcement Actions
Courts have not yet had the opportunity to interpret these new statutes, but attorneys general in several states have begun to use their powers under pre-existing consumer protection and deceptive trade practices
laws to achieve the policy goals pursued by the statutes. State law enforcement efforts have thus far focused mainly on the notorious “scanner
troll,” MPHJ, and its lawyers. The Vermont attorney general, for instance, sued MPHJ in Vermont state court in May 2013, alleging that
MPHJ’s demand letters violated Vermont’s general consumer protection
statute. 122 (The suit was filed two weeks before Vermont’s patent enforcement statute took effect.) As relief, the state sought an injunction
requiring MPHJ to stop threatening Vermont businesses with patent infringement lawsuits, restitution to businesses harmed by MPHJ’s actions, and civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation. 123 As of
this writing, the case is pending in Vermont state court after MPHJ’s unsuccessful attempt to remove the case to federal court. 124
Around the same time Vermont sued MPHJ, the attorney general of
Nebraska began an investigation into whether Farney Daniels, the law
firm representing MPHJ and Activision TV, another nonpracticing entity, had violated Nebraska’s consumer protection and deceptive trade
practices statutes. 125 (Nebraska has, to date, not passed a statute to specifically regulate patent enforcement.) In July 2013, the attorney general
sent Farney Daniels a cease-and-desist order that prohibited the firm
from initiating new patent enforcement efforts in Nebraska. 126 As discussed in more detail below, Activision and MPHJ obtained an injunc122
See Consumer Protection Complaint at 1–8, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No.
282-5-13wncv (Vt. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/
files/Vermont%20v%20MPHJ%20Technologies%20Complaint.pdf.
123
See id. at 10.
124
See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-170, 2014 WL 1494009, at *1
(D. Vt. Apr. 15, 2014).
125
See Richard Piersol, Bruning, Nebraska Companies Enveloped in Patent Litigation, Lincoln J. Star, Aug. 24, 2013, http://journalstar.com/business/local/bruning-nebraska-companiesenveloped-in-patent-litigation/article_aac06dd8-504f-5086-9878-3036c7c0fbc8.html.
126
Letter from Jon Bruning, Attorney Gen. of Neb., to M. Brett Johnson, Partner, Farney
Daniels LLP (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/234/2014/01/2013-07-18-AG-Cease-and-Desist-Order.pdf.

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1600

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1579

tion prohibiting enforcement of that order, with the district court holding
that, under Federal Circuit law, the order was “preempted by federal [patent] law.” 127
In addition, the attorneys general of two states, New York and Minnesota, have negotiated agreements with MPHJ to curb its enforcement activity. An agreement between MPHJ and the attorney general of Minnesota requires the company, before sending any demand letters to
Minnesota businesses, to give the attorney general’s office sixty days’
notice and to obtain its consent. 128 Similarly, an “Assurance of Discontinuance” between MPHJ and the attorney general of New York prohibits MPHJ from asserting its patents through shell subsidiaries without
disclosing the subsidiaries’ relationship to MPHJ and also imposes detailed guidelines for future assertions of infringement. 129
In sum, patent enforcement campaigns targeted at end users have
spurred state legislatures and state law enforcement officials to take an
increased interest in patent law. Under Federal Circuit law, however,
this federalism revolution may be unconstitutional.
II. PREEMPTION AND PETITIONING IMMUNITY
The constitutional barrier that immediately comes to mind, given the
federal nature of substantive patent law, is preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Some states that have passed statutes regulating patent
enforcement appear to be aware of preemption concerns. The preamble
to the Vermont statute, for instance, states that the legislature “recognizes that Vermont is preempted from passing any law that conflicts with
federal patent law.” 130 And the Alabama statute instructs that the act
“shall be interpreted consistently with any federal law or regulations

127

Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, slip. op. at 5, 10 (D. Neb. Sept. 2,
2014) (citing Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2004)); see also infra Section IV.C (discussing the Activision case in more detail).
128
Julie Samuels, Minnesota: Patent Trolls Are Not Welcome Here, Elec. Frontier Found.
(Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/minnesota-patent-trolls-are-not-welcomehere.
129
Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen. of the State of New York, MPHJ
Technology Investments, LLC, Assurance No. 14-015, at 1, 12–19 (Jan. 13, 2014). For example, MPHJ agreed that it will not assert patents against businesses or individuals in New
York unless it makes “reasonable efforts to identify and evaluate a specific accused product,
system, or method that the [accused infringer] makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells that
[MPHJ] believes in good faith actually infringes the [a]sserted patent.” Id. at 12.
130
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(3) (2014).
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governing patents or patent infringement.” 131 Under Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the Supremacy Clause, however, these new statutes likely avoid preemption. Yet the Federal Circuit has treated those
Supreme Court decisions—including decisions that deal specifically
with the preemptive scope of the federal Patent Act—as mostly irrelevant when assessing the power of the states to regulate patent enforcement. Instead, the Federal Circuit has relied on the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to hold that, because of the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment, states may outlaw assertions of infringement only if the patent holder made the allegations with knowledge that they were objectively baseless.
A. Federal Preemption
Federal preemption doctrine permits Congress, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, to displace state laws when exercising its legislative
powers under Article I. The Supreme Court has decided several cases
exploring the extent to which the federal Patent Act preempts state laws
that grant patent-like intellectual property rights. If courts were to apply
the reasoning of those decisions to state laws regulating patent enforcement, it seems unlikely those state laws would be preempted.
1. Preemption Generally
Preemption doctrine is grounded in the Supremacy Clause, which
provides in relevant part: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 132 Preemption can be either express or implied.
The doctrine of express preemption recognizes that Congress may
withdraw specific powers from the states by enacting a statute that says
so. 133 Express preemption doctrine is largely irrelevant in patent matters.

131

Ala. Code § 35-4-405(b) (LexisNexis 2014).
U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. For a challenge to the conventional view that preemption doctrine flows from the Supremacy Clause, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 769 (1994). For an exploration of the preemptive effect of the
IP Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which empowers Congress to create the patent and
copyright laws, see Fromer, supra note 52, at 265, 276–81.
133
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012).
132
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As the Federal Circuit has noted, the federal Patent Act “plainly does not
provide for” express preemption. 134
Patent preemption disputes therefore focus on implied preemption.
One type of implied preemption potentially relevant to patent matters,
given that substantive patent law is entirely federal, is field preemption.
Field preemption arises when there is a framework of regulation “so
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”
or when there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.” 135 Another variety of implied preemption that is potentially relevant to the new state patent enforcement statutes is conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption occurs when, among other things, state law “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” 136 As discussed in more detail below, one
might suggest that the new state laws conflict with patent holders’ obligation under the federal Patent Act to notify alleged infringers of their
infringement. 137
Although commentators have claimed that modern preemption doctrine is, among other things, a “muddle,” 138 the Supreme Court has been
quite clear that “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.” 139 Of course, the difficulty in implied preemption disputes is that the statute itself, by definition, says nothing explicit
about Congress’s purpose to preempt or merely to supplement state law.
Accordingly, Thomas Merrill has reduced the implied preemption analysis to three basic inquiries: determining the requirements of the federal
statute or regulation at issue, determining what the relevant state law requires, and then asking whether any tension between the state law and
federal law “is sufficiently severe to warrant the displacement of state
law in light of all relevant factors that bear on this decision.” 140 Rather
than asking a hollow question about Congress’s nonexistent or indeterminate intent, this framework recognizes that implied preemption analy134

Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
136
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
137
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5) (2012); infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
138
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 232–33 (2000) (citing additional criticism).
139
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n,
Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 743
(2008).
135
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sis is, at bottom, “a multifaceted, high-stakes discretionary policy judgment.” 141
2. The Supreme Court on Patent Preemption
The Supreme Court’s preemption decisions dealing specifically with
patent matters are consistent with the implied preemption framework
deployed in other substantive areas. That is, it looks nothing like the
Noerr-based “preemption” test the Federal Circuit has applied to state
law claims challenging a patent holder’s enforcement behavior. To be
sure, none of these Supreme Court cases involved state laws regulating
patent enforcement. But the structure of the Court’s analysis—
examining the policies behind the patent-related state law and weighing
it against the policies embodied in federal patent law—is plainly relevant to the question of whether federal patent law preempts state laws
regulating patent assertions.
The Supreme Court’s patent preemption doctrine traces its roots to a
pair of decisions issued in 1964. In those decisions, the Court held
preempted a state unfair competition law that the lower courts had construed to prohibit the copying of unpatented lamps and light fixtures that
had been sold to the public. 142 The Court reasoned that the state law
“clashed with” federal law because the designs of the widely available
lamps and fixtures were, under the Patent Act, in the public domain. 143
A decade later, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. presented the question of whether Ohio’s trade secrets law was preempted by federal patent law. 144 Elaborating on its conflict preemption analysis, the Court
noted that “[t]o determine whether the Ohio law ‘clashes’ with the federal law it is helpful to examine the objectives of both the patent and
trade secret laws.” 145 The Court identified three purposes of the federal
141
Id. at 744; see also Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption
in Context, in Federal Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests 1, 2 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (“[I]t has come to be widely acknowledged . . . that
preemption questions cannot be reduced to the judicial exegesis of (often ambiguous) federal
statutes. While statutory interpretation is a large part of the preemption picture, preemption
doctrine is also, and centrally, a question of institutional design and constitutional understanding.”).
142
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964).
143
Compco, 376 U.S. at 237–38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231–33.
144
416 U.S. 470, 472 (1974).
145
Id. at 480 (quoting Sears, 376 U.S. at 231).
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patent laws: to provide an incentive for inventors; to induce disclosure
of inventions; and, through the requirements of patent validity such as
novelty and nonobviousness, to ensure that ideas in the public domain
stay there. 146 As for the purposes of state trade secrets law, the Court
noted two: maintaining standards of commercial ethics and encouraging
invention. 147
The Court held that Ohio’s trade secrets law was not an obstacle to
achieving the purposes of federal patent law. The Court noted that the
federal policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence
of an additional incentive for invention and that the federal policy of
protecting the public domain was not disturbed by trade secrets law because trade secrets, by definition, have not been disclosed to the public. 148 The Court conceded that state trade secret protection for inventions that are also patentable would be an obstacle to the federal policy
of encouraging disclosure. 149 The Court characterized this obstacle as
minor, however, because in its view few inventors would choose the “far
weaker” protection of trade secrets law, 150 and because many inventions
are made independently by multiple people close in time and those later
inventors may disclose the invention. 151
The Court in Kewanee also highlighted the states’ interest in the continued existence of their trade secrets laws. For example, the Court noted
the states’ interest in regulating the ethics of the marketplace, writing:
“Nothing in the patent law requires that States refrain from action to
prevent industrial espionage. . . . A most fundamental human right, that
of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is
made profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable.” 152 The Court also emphasized the long history
of state laws protecting trade secrets, noting that “[t]rade secret law and

146

Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 481.
148
Id. at 484.
149
Id. at 489.
150
For instance, trade secrets law, unlike patent law, does not prohibit reverse engineering.
See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 311, 330 (2008).
151
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489–91. The Court’s assumption that few inventors would
choose trade secret protection over patent protection has been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After
Kewanee, 42 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 927, 946 (1974).
152
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 487.
147
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patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred
years.” 153
The Court’s most recent word on patent preemption suggested that
state interests continue to be relevant to the analysis. Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. presented the question of whether federal
patent law preempted a Florida statute that prohibited duplicating boat
hulls that were not patentable under federal law. 154 Explaining its refusal
to find preemption in Kewanee, the Court in Bonito Boats emphasized
that “certain aspects of trade secret law operated to protect noneconomic interests outside the sphere of congressional concern in the patent laws,” such as preventing economic espionage. 155 The Court also
identified what is arguably a fourth purpose of federal patent law, noting
that “[o]ne of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright
Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the
realm of intellectual property.” 156 “This purpose,” the Court noted, was
“frustrated by the Florida scheme, which render[ed] the status of the design and utilitarian ‘ideas’ embodied in . . . boat hulls . . . uncertain.” 157
3. Preemption of State Patent Enforcement Statutes Under the
Supremacy Clause
Under the Supreme Court’s preemption case law, there is a strong argument that state laws regulating patent enforcement, such as the new
statutes, are not preempted. To begin with, it is difficult to see how any
of the three objectives of federal patent law identified in Kewanee would
be compromised by state law claims challenging bad faith or deceptive
enforcement conduct. As the Federal Circuit itself noted in ruling that a
state law tort claim against a patent holder was not preempted under
Kewanee, “it seems most improbable that an inventor would choose to
forfeit the benefits of patent protection because of fear of the risk of being found tortiously liable” for its enforcement conduct. 158 Also, similar
to the long history of state trade secrets law discussed in Kewanee, 159 the
states have traditionally played a role in regulating abusive and anticom153

Id. at 493.
489 U.S. 141, 144 (1989).
155
Id. at 155.
156
Id. at 162.
157
Id.
158
Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
159
416 U.S. at 493.
154
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petitive assertions of legal rights through common law torts such as
wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process, tortious interference, and business disparagement. Those bodies of law serve purposes
much different from the innovation-promoting purpose of the federal patent laws.
State-by-state regulation of patent enforcement does threaten to impede national uniformity, which was one of the Court’s reasons for finding preemption in Bonito Boats. Yet it is not as if the fifty different
states take fifty different approaches to unfair competition law, deceptive trade practices law, or business torts. Many of the new state statutes
are also similar, condemning “bad faith” assertions of patent infringement. 160 In addition, the uniformity with which the Supreme Court was
concerned in Bonito Boats was uniformity in the scope of intellectual
property rights. When the Court has been confronted with bodies of state
law, such as contract law, that govern intellectual property rights whose
scope has already been determined by federal law, the Court has allowed
state law room to operate. 161
Of course, none of the Supreme Court’s patent preemption cases involve state laws regulating patent enforcement. Thus, one might reasonably look beyond Kewanee and Bonito Boats and suggest that state laws
regulating assertions of patent infringement conflict with the provision
of the Patent Act requiring patent holders, as a prerequisite to recovering
damages for infringement, to provide accused infringers with notice of
their infringement. 162 The Federal Circuit has emphasized that federal
law protects the right of a patent holder to provide notice to an accused
infringer so that the accused infringer “can determine whether to cease
its allegedly infringing activities, negotiate a license if one is offered, or
decide to run the risk of liability and/or the imposition of an injunction.” 163 As the Federal Circuit has also recognized, however, the patent
holder loses its protection if it sends those notifications “in bad faith.” 164
Thus, a state statute that outlawed sending any type of notice would be
preempted for conflict with federal law. But state laws that merely out-

160

See supra Section I.A.
See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (holding that
federal patent law did not preempt a state law breach of contract claim seeking royalties for
sales of an invention that was the subject of an unsuccessful patent application).
162
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012).
163
Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
164
E.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
161
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law the smaller class of patent notices sent in bad faith do not present the
same danger of interference with the federal scheme of notification.
Drawing on principles of field preemption, one might suggest that
state anti-troll statutes are preempted because they touch on a distinctly
federal matter: the enforcement of patents. The Supreme Court has invoked a similar rationale to preempt, for example, state law tort claims
based on fraud before the Food and Drug Administration 165 and an Arizona law that attempted to regulate immigration. 166 The Constitution
certainly makes patents a matter of federal concern, 167 and Congress has
given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising under
patent law. 168 As noted, however, many different bodies of state law
govern patent rights created by federal law and are not preempted, including contract law, family law, and probate law. 169 In fact, the new
statutes regulating patent enforcement are not the only statutes state legislatures have passed to specifically govern federal patent rights. Numerous states have statutes that regulate the ownership of patented inventions developed by employees. 170 None of those statutes, to my
knowledge, have been struck down on preemption grounds. Moreover,
the field preemption argument is weakened by the fact that the federal
Patent Act simply does not address the issue of unfair or deceptive patent enforcement—it neither condemns nor immunizes it. This distinguishes the new state patent enforcement statutes from state laws the
Supreme Court has found preempted for touching on distinctly federal
matters. The federal food and drug laws, for instance, contain “various
provisions aimed at detecting, deterring, and punishing false statements
made during . . . [the] approval processes,” 171 and the federal immigration laws address many of the issues that the Arizona statute sought to
regulate, such as registration and employment requirements. 172
165

See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347–48 (2001).
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
167
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
168
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
169
See supra Part I.
170
See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 2870 (West 2014); Employee Patent Act, 765 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 1060/2 (2014); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.500 (West 2014); see also Robert P.
Merges, Peter S. Menell & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age 87 (6th ed. 2012) (collecting statutes).
171
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 (2001).
172
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–05 (2012).
166
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Also, federal courts may be less willing to find preemption as state
patent enforcement laws continue to proliferate and state law enforcement officials take an active regulatory role. 173 Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently ruled that the federal courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction
does not extend to state law claims alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case, 174 opening the door for state courts to occasionally
opine on the substance of federal patent law. And even the Federal Circuit, which has generally shielded patent holders from state law liability
for their enforcement activity, has refused to find field preemption of
state law tort and unfair competition claims against patent holders. 175
That said, to the extent that the new state laws essentially create a new
tort claim, one might expect a conservative Supreme Court to eagerly
find that tort claim preempted. 176 Then again, as Ernest Young as observed, “preemption cases implicate a number of cross-cutting ideological and methodological conflicts on the Court,” so it can be hazardous to
predict the outcome of a preemption case based solely on politics. 177 In
the end, given the unpredictability of preemption analysis, 178 it is impossible to forecast with certainty whether the Supreme Court would find
preempted state statutes regulating patent enforcement. My point here,
though, is simple: Under a traditional, Supremacy Clause-based preemption analysis—unlike under the Federal Circuit’s First Amendmentbased “preemption” rule—the states arguably have the authority to regulate patent enforcement.
B. Petitioning Immunity
Before exploring the Federal Circuit case law that renders the states
practically powerless to regulate patent enforcement, it is helpful to cover some background on how federal law protects from civil liability per173
See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
18 (2011) (noting that several recent Supreme Court preemption decisions “reflect judicial
unease over increasing federal displacement of state law and state regulatory authority”).
174
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
175
See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
176
See Metzger, supra note 173, at 4.
177
Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253, 304, 342.
178
See David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1125, 1139 (2012)
(noting that “the preemption calculus yields a ‘muddled,’ ‘haphazard,’ and unpredictable jurisprudential landscape”).
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sons who petition the government through means such as filing lawsuits.
Like preemption, these doctrines of petitioning immunity have constitutional dimensions. Specifically, the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 179 The Supreme
Court has grappled with the Petition Clause in two lines of cases.
First, the Supreme Court in several cases has considered claims by
plaintiffs that a defendant’s petition to the government violated the antitrust laws. This line of cases begins with Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., which involved a publicity
campaign by the railroad industry “designed to foster the adoption and
retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business.” 180 The Court held that the railroads were immune from an
antitrust suit brought by truck operators “insofar as [the railroads’] activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to
the passage and enforcement of laws.” 181
The Court based this immunity on its interpretation of the federal antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, noting that agreements among firms to
seek favorable legislation or executive action “bear very little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman
Act,” which usually involve agreements to “give up . . . trade freedom”
or to “take away the trade freedom of others” through acts of pricefixing or market division. 182 The Court continued: “To hold . . . that the
people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the
legislative history of that Act.” 183 The Court’s interpretation of the
Sherman Act was influenced by the First Amendment, as the Court noted that construing the Sherman Act to regulate the railroads’ publicity
campaign “would raise important constitutional questions.” 184 “The right
179
U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added). On the history of the right to petition, which
can be traced back to Magna Carta and earlier, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 743–56 (1999).
180
365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961).
181
Id. at 138.
182
Id. at 136.
183
Id. at 137.
184
Id. at 138.
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of petition,” the Court explained, “is one of the freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights, and we cannot . . . lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.” 185
The Court in Noerr also made clear that immunity from antitrust liability based on petitioning activity is not unlimited. In articulating what
came to be known as the “sham” exception to the Noerr doctrine, the
Court noted that “[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationship of a competitor.” 186 In
those situations, the Court explained, “the application of the Sherman
Act would be justified.” 187
Although the Noerr decision itself immunized from antitrust liability
the act of lobbying the legislature and the executive, the Court later extended Noerr immunity to the act of pursuing litigation. 188 In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc., 189 the Court elaborated on the showing required to establish the
sham exception, adopting the two-part test that would heavily influence
the Federal Circuit’s preemption rule. In Professional Real Estate Investors, the plaintiff, a hotel operator, alleged that the defendant movie studios had violated the antitrust laws by bringing a copyright infringement
suit when the studios “did not honestly believe that the infringement
claim was meritorious.” 190 The Court rejected the antitrust claim because
it was based solely on the defendants’ subjective intent. 191 In so doing,
the Court articulated the requirements for stripping a defendant of antitrust immunity in a “two-part definition of ‘sham’ litigation”:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated
to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and
185

Id.
Id. at 144.
187
Id.
188
See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972). For a
critique of this expansion of Noerr, see David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 293, 399 (1994).
189
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
190
Id. at 54.
191
Id. at 57.
186
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an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
litigant’s subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit
conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor, through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon. 192

Although Noerr immunity is now firmly embedded in the Supreme
Court’s antitrust case law, the Court has never held that defendants can
invoke Noerr as protection against claims not sounding in antitrust. 193
To that end, scholars have vigorously debated whether the immunity
doctrine that stems from Noerr is based on the First Amendment, in
which case it would provide immunity from all types of civil claims, not
just antitrust claims, or on the Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act,
in which case Noerr would provide immunity only from antitrust
claims. 194 Although the matter remains unsettled, some suggestion that
Noerr has limited relevance to patent matters can be found in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc. 195 In that case, the Court overturned Federal Circuit case
law that required a prevailing party seeking attorneys’ fees in a patent

192

Id. at 60–61 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has, to be sure, drawn on Noerr in other areas, particularly in articulating the ability of the National Labor Relations Board to condemn retaliatory lawsuits
filed by employers against their employees. See, e.g., BE&K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S.
516, 525, 536 (2002) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 69; Cal. Motor
Transp., 404 U.S. at 511; E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 144 (1961)) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) does not
permit the Board to impose liability on an employer for its “reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose”); Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744
(1983) (citing Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510) (holding that, under the NLRA, the
Board may enjoin an employer’s “baseless lawsuit [filed] with the intent of retaliating
against an employee”).
194
See Einer Elhague, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 Calif. L. Rev.
1177, 1194 & n.99 (1992) (collecting commentary). Elhague expressly avoids engaging
questions about the basis of Noerr immunity, instead urging a “functional process” approach
to antitrust immunity that assesses whether the decision maker who imposed the restraint had
“an objective financial interest in the restraint’s anticompetitive consequences.” Id. at 1180,
1194.
195
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
193
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case to satisfy Noerr by showing that its opponent pursued an objectively baseless case in subjective bad faith. 196
Nevertheless, lower courts have widely concluded that Noerr’s First
Amendment aspects require the doctrine to be applied to all types of civil claims seeking to impose liability for litigation conduct, not just to antitrust claims. 197 For example, courts have applied the doctrine to claims
of tortious interference, abuse of process, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and even civil rights claims. 198 In addition,
many lower courts have extended Noerr to immunize not only the act of
pursuing litigation in court but also statements made in pre-litigation
communications. 199 As discussed in more detail below, the Federal Circuit has embraced all of these expansions of Noerr immunity to broadly
protect patent holders from any type of civil liability based on their enforcement conduct, whether or not that conduct relates to a pending lawsuit. 200
In a second line of cases involving the Petition Clause, however, the
Supreme Court has provided some guidance about the scope of the right
to petition when the antitrust laws are not involved, casting doubt on the
lower courts’ unflinching expansion of Noerr immunity to all types of

196
Id. at 1757. Even if Noerr is based entirely on the First Amendment, as some have argued, see, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 100
(1977); McGowan & Lemley, supra note 188, at 301, the First Amendment does not, in my
view, protect deceptive or false statements made in demand letters sent between private parties. See infra Section V.A.
197
See, e.g., IGEN Int’l v. Roche Diagnostics, 335 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[A]lthough originally developed in the antitrust context, the doctrine has now universally
been applied to business torts.”).
198
See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment
Challenge, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 665, 678 n.59 (2000) (collecting cases); Aaron R. Gary, First
Amendment Petition Clause Immunity from Tort Suits: In Search of a Consistent Doctrinal
Framework, 33 Idaho L. Rev. 67, 95–97 (1996) (same). Noerr has also successfully been
invoked by defendants to strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPPs”)—
lawsuits, often claims for defamation or tortious interference, that are filed to intimidate defendants from exercising their petitioning and free speech rights. See, e.g., Protect Our
Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (holding that, to
avoid dismissal on First Amendment grounds, the plaintiff in an alleged SLAPP must show,
among other things, that the defendant’s actions were “devoid of reasonable factual support[]
or . . . lacked any cognizable basis in law” and were made for “the primary purpose
of . . . harass[ing] the plaintiff or . . . effectuat[ing] some other improper objective”).
199
See 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 205f, at 302–03 (4th
ed. 2013) (citing cases).
200
See infra Part III.
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civil claims. Most notable among those decisions is McDonald v.
Smith. 201 In that case, the defendant wrote two letters to the President alleging that the plaintiff, who was being considered for a position as a
U.S. Attorney, had engaged in blackmail, extortion, and civil rights violations. 202 The plaintiff did not get the position and sued the defendant
for libel. 203 The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Petition
Clause granted him absolute immunity from the libel claim. 204 The Court
noted that to accept that argument “would elevate the Petition Clause to
special First Amendment status” when, in fact, it “was inspired by the
same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak,
publish, and assemble.” 205 Accordingly, the Court reasoned, “there is no
sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements
made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.” 206 Because the relevant state law required the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant acted with malice, which was consistent with the
Court’s precedent on the right to free speech, the Court held that the
right to petition did not preclude the libel suit. 207
The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald casts doubt on the lower
courts’ grant of Noerr immunity to defendants faced with non-antitrust
claims. Noerr, recall, was arguably based on an interpretation of the
Sherman Act in light of the First Amendment right to petition. 208 If the
Sherman Act is removed from the picture, the defendant’s sole protection is the Petition Clause, and McDonald appears to be the more relevant case.209 In McDonald, the Court suggested that the Petition Clause
allows state tort law room to operate, so long as that state law does not
201

472 U.S. 479 (1985).
Id. at 480–81.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 485.
205
Id. For a critique of the Court’s “unwillingness to give independent meaning and effect
to the Petition Clause,” see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reclaiming the Petition Clause 157–
62 (2012).
206
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
207
Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
208
See supra text accompanying notes 182–85; see also Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 263 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that “we have previously
interpreted . . . generally applicable statutes so as to avoid First Amendment problems,” citing Noerr as an example).
209
For a rare judicial opinion recognizing this distinction, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889–90 (10th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“The logical dilemma in applying Noerr-Pennington outside of the antitrust context is that Noerr’s
first rationale for immunity—an interpretation of the Sherman Act—is not present.”).
202
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condemn speech that is protected by the First Amendment. In many scenarios, the First Amendment does not protect speech that is intentionally
false or deceptive, 210 such as outlandish claims for patent infringement
damages intended to elicit nuisance-value settlements from small or unsophisticated businesses or organizations. The law can therefore condemn those statements without violating the patent holder’s constitutional rights.
Although the Supreme Court has recently suggested that false statements are not categorically exempt from First Amendment protection, 211
the Court has reiterated that false statements may be condemned when
they produce or are likely to produce “specific harm to identifiable victims,” 212 such as those under the common law torts of fraud and defamation. The types of false statements commonly made during patent enforcement, such as misrepresentations about the strength of the patents
or how many other businesses or organizations have already licensed the
patents, can cause numerous tangible harms. An accused infringer, for
instance, might be intimidated into purchasing an unnecessary license.
Also, if the false statements are directed toward end users, the manufacturer of the relevant product might lose sales or suffer damage to its reputation. Although the First Amendment may impose some limits on the
patent enforcement conduct that may be condemned, 213 requiring objective baselessness as a prerequisite to all claims, as the Federal Circuit

210
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its
own sake.”); see also Illinois v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”).
211
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality opinion).
212
See id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2545 (plurality
opinion) (noting that prior decisions in which the Court held false statements not to be protected by the First Amendment involved “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy or the costs of
vexatious litigation”).
213
For instance, one commentator has argued that statutes requiring particular information
to be included in a demand letter violate constitutional restrictions on compelled speech. See
Hearing on H.R. __, A Bill to Enhance Federal and State Enforcement of Fraudulent Patent
Demand Letters Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 3–4 (May 22, 2014) (statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law), available at http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20140522/102255/HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-MossoffA-20140522.pdf
[hereinafter Mossoff].
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does, seems to provide defendants with more protection than the Constitution actually mandates. 214
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision involving the Petition
Clause, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 215 supports the notion that Noerr
immunity should not apply to non-antitrust claims. In that case, Guarnieri
had been fired from his position as the borough’s chief of police, but he
filed a union grievance and was reinstated. 216 After Guarnieri’s reinstatement, the borough issued eleven directives instructing Guarnieri in
the performance of his duties. 217 Guarnieri then sued the borough, claiming that his grievance was a petition protected by the First Amendment
and that the directives were impermissible retaliation for his constitutionally protected activity. 218 On appeal, the Third Circuit applied a
standard derived from Noerr and held that Guarnieri was immune from
retaliation so long as his grievance was not a sham. 219 The Supreme
Court, however, refused to apply the sham standard to determine whether Guarnieri’s grievance was protected by the First Amendment. 220 Instead, the Court analogized to McDonald and held that the same test
used to determine whether public employees’ speech is protected by the
Speech Clause should apply to those employees’ claims under the Petition Clause. 221 The Guarnieri Court’s reliance on Speech Clause precedent—rather than the sham exception—to resolve a Petition Clause

214
See generally Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1243, 1262 (1984) (arguing that Noerr should not be applied in non-antitrust cases). For a broader argument that
courts should “employ first amendment principles developed in free speech cases to guide
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,” including in antitrust cases, see Fischel, supra
note 194, at 100.
215
131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
216
Id. at 2492.
217
Id. The directives included statements such as “[t]he police car is to be used for official
business only” and “the Duryea municipal building is a smoke free building and . . . the police department is not exempt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
218
Id.
219
See Guarnieri v. Duryea Borough, 364 F. App’x 749, 753 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing San
Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 440 (3d Cir. 1994), in turn citing Cal. Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961)).
220
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2495.
221
Id. Public employees’ speech is protected by the Speech Clause only if it is on a matter
of public concern. See id. at 2493 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
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claim again suggests that Noerr has limited relevance outside of antitrust
law.
Case law assessing the First Amendment implications of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) provides a final illustration of what
should be Noerr’s limited reach outside of antitrust cases. The FDCPA
prohibits debt collectors, including attorneys engaged in litigation, 222
from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations223—much
like the new state statutes condemn similar representations made in connection with patent enforcement. Defendants to FDCPA claims have argued that it violates the First Amendment to penalize the filing of court
pleadings unless those pleadings are objectively baseless under Noerr. 224
But the lower federal courts have rejected that argument, holding that,
under cases such as McDonald, intentional misrepresentations are simply not protected by the Petition Clause, regardless of the merit of the underlying claim. 225
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENT “PREEMPTION”
In the thirty years since its creation, the Federal Circuit has developed
a line of case law substantially restricting the states’ ability to regulate
patent enforcement. Although the Federal Circuit has sometimes framed
those decisions as involving preemption under the Supremacy Clause,
the core issue is actually petitioning immunity under the First Amendment. In more recent opinions, the Federal Circuit has begun to rectify
that mischaracterization, but confusion as to the constitutional basis for
limiting state authority has caused the court to ignore difficult underlying questions about the proper scope of patent holders’ immunity from
civil liability. For example, should the stringent “sham litigation” test
developed in antitrust cases such as Noerr apply to non-antitrust claims
challenging patent enforcement? Should the First Amendment right to
petition “the government” protect pre-litigation communications from
one private party to another? The stakes surrounding these questions are
high, for if the First Amendment requires that patent holders receive
222

See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).
15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012).
224
See, e.g., Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2009).
225
See id. at 616; see also Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 229 (4th Cir.
2007) (rejecting the argument that “an absolute common law immunity attaches to ‘any
statements made during the course of judicial proceedings’” and therefore immunizes lawyers’ litigation activity from the FDCPA).
223
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broad, Noerr-like immunity for all communications related to patent enforcement, then governments—both state and federal—are largely powerless to engage the problem that has captured the attention of policymakers and the public: demand letters that contain plausible allegations
of infringement but that also contain statements that are deceptive or
false.
A. Immunity for Patent Holders
Federal law has long protected the right of patent holders to make
“good faith” allegations of patent infringement. Yet the Federal Circuit
has turned what was initially a flexible standard grounded in equity into
a rigid, two-part test that is exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy.
1. Equitable Roots of Good Faith Immunity
The principle that courts will condemn only bad faith assertions of patent infringement, and that good faith assertions of infringement are
therefore immune from civil liability, can be traced back to at leat the
nineteenth century. A leading example is Emack v. Kane, decided in
1888. 226 In that case, the plaintiff Emack and the defendant Kane were
competing manufacturers of writing slates for school children. 227 Kane
sent several letters to the dealers who purchased the slates for resale to
school districts, claiming that Emack’s slate infringed a patent owned by
Kane and threatening litigation against the dealers. 228 The letters noted,
among other things, that Kane had retained attorneys who had “an extensive and very successful” practice “in prosecuting infringement cases,” that Kane intended to hold dealers who sold the infringing slate responsible for “royalt[ies] and damages,” and that Kane “expect[ed] to
commence some suits” within the next few months. 229
On Emack’s request, the court enjoined Kane from sending additional
letters. The court found that the letters were “intended to intimidate”
Emack’s customers, and that the threats of suit were made “with a malicious intent to injure and destroy [Emack’s] business.” 230 In addition, the
court found that Kane “did not intend to prosecute” his threatened suits,
226

34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
Id. at 47.
228
See id. at 47–48.
229
Id. at 48.
230
Id. at 50.
227
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noting that Kane had actually sued three of Emack’s customers, but then
voluntarily dismissed the claims because Kane “knew that [he] could not
sustain the suits upon their merits.” 231 Therefore, the court concluded,
the “threats made . . . were not made in good faith.” 232
Although some courts initially refused to follow Emack and grant injunctions against bad faith assertions of infringement, 233 the case eventually came to be the touchstone for the courts’ power to enjoin assertions of patent infringement. 234 Early-twentieth-century commentators,
reviewing the relevant case law, also concluded that courts had the equitable power to enjoin assertions of infringement made in bad faith. 235
That rule was applied by numerous courts prior to the creation of the
Federal Circuit in 1982. 236
Although good faith has been called an “elusive idea,” taking on different meanings in different contexts, 237 good faith in patent enforcement traditionally referred to a subjective concept: that the speaker “sincerely believe[d] in the truth of his statement.” 238 In the early cases, a

231

Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 49.
233
See, e.g., Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163, 166–67 (N.Y. 1902) (dismissing
Emack as “a decision by a single judge”); see also 2 James L. High, A Treatise on the Law
of Injunctions 775 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 3d ed. 1890) (noting conflicting decisions);
Albert H. Walker, Text-Book of The Law of Patents for Inventions § 585a, at 648–50 (John
H. Hilliard & Eugene Eblé eds., 5th ed. 1917) (similar).
234
See 2 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks,
and Monopolies § 11:31, at 11-140–43 (4th ed. 2008).
235
See, e.g., 2 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equitable Remedies § 2051 & n.6 (2d
ed. 1919) (discussing cases on “the injunction of intimidating circulars” regarding patent
rights and noting that “sending out circulars in good faith will not be enjoined”); Roscoe
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev.
640, 655 n.41 (1916) (“[T]here is coming to be good authority for enjoining circulars charging infringement of a patent and threatening purchasers from plaintiff with legal proceedings, where such circulars are published with no intention of suing for the alleged infringement or in pure malice.”).
236
See Annotation, Right to Enjoin Threats of Suits for Alleged Infringement of Patent, 98
A.L.R. 671, 671–81 (1935) (collecting cases); Mark S. Bicks, Threatening to Sue for Patent
Infringement: Unfair Competition and Antitrust Consequences, 59 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 302,
303–14 (1977) (same).
237
Roger Brownsword et al., Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context, in Good Faith
in Contract: Concept and Context 1, 3 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 1999).
238
Altman & Pollack, supra note 234, § 11:10, at 11-40–41 & n.14 (citing cases); see also
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (“‘Bad faith’ . . . is a subjective state of mind the existence of which, while not susceptible to certain proof, easily can
spring from suggestive and weakly corroborative circumstances.”); Bicks, supra note 236, at
232
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common basis for finding that the defendant lacked a sincere belief in its
claims of patent infringement was that the defendant had threatened to
file suit but never did so. 239 Conversely, when the patent holder followed
its threats with an infringement suit, courts refused to find bad faith. 240
It should be noted that many of those cases were decided before Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934, so the accused infringers had no avenue to alleviate their uncertainty about whether they
were infringing. 241 In a case decided after the Act was passed, the Second Circuit emphasized that a delay in bringing suit, standing alone,
would not justify a finding of bad faith. 242 Rather, the court ruled that a
plaintiff would need to present “other evidence indicating a lack of honest belief in the legal rights asserted,” citing as an example a case in
which there was uncontradicted evidence that the patent holder’s infringement claim was meritless. 243
As the Second Circuit’s decision suggested, an analysis of a patent
holder’s good or bad faith often included both objective and subjective
considerations. 244 Courts in the pre-Federal Circuit era would consider
the objective merit of the patent holder’s claim as evidence of the sincerity of the infringement allegations. 245 But those courts did not require a
plaintiff to prove both that the infringement allegations were baseless
and made with knowledge of that baselessness, as the Federal Circuit requires today. Rather, they applied the good faith standard in a manner
consistent with its equitable roots, flexibly using it to condemn decep-

303–04 (“The good faith involved refers to a state of mind and, in this context, means that
the speaker sincerely and reasonably believes in the truth of his statements.”).
239
See, e.g., Racine Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 F. 631, 635–36 (7th Cir. 1909);
Adriance, Platt & Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 121 F. 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1903); A.B. Farquhar
Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900).
240
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Int’l Tailoring Co., 169 F. 145, 146 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Warren
Featherbone Co. v. Landauer, 151 F. 130, 134 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1903).
241
On the history and passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201–02 (2012), see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System 800–01 (6th ed. 2009).
242
Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1950).
243
Id. (citing Betmar Hats v. Young Am. Hats, 116 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1941)).
244
Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2014) (“‘Good faith’ . . . means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”).
245
See, e.g., Int’l Indus. & Devs. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 145 F. Supp. 34, 36 (S.D. Ohio
1956) (“The Court finds, as a matter of fact, that plaintiff’s failure to introduce any evidence
at trial to support its charge of infringement conclusively establishes bad faith and malice . . . .”); Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 49 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888) (relying on Kane’s voluntary
dismissal of three infringement suits as evidence of bad faith).
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tive patent enforcement tactics, such as alleging infringement when the
patent holder had not actually inspected the accused infringer’s product 246 or boasting that the patent’s validity had been confirmed by a
court when, in fact, prior cases had merely settled. 247 The pliability of
the good faith standard was captured by a commentator writing shortly
before the creation of the Federal Circuit who observed that “[i]n determining whether a course of conduct in giving notice of patent rights and
threatening patent infringement suits . . . subjects the actor to liability . . . , all the factors which manifest the actor’s intent must be considered and balanced against one another.” 248
2. Good Faith in the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit’s early decisions suggested that good faith immunity was indeed a malleable concept. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc. 249 is the leading example. In that case, Mallinckrodt manufactured
and sold to hospitals a patented medical device that was labeled “Single
Use Only” and was packaged with an insert instructing that, after one
use, the entire device should be discarded as hazardous biological
waste. 250 Some hospitals, rather than discarding the device, sold the used
devices to Medipart for reconditioning and reuse. 251 Mallinckrodt sued
Medipart for patent infringement, but the district court held that Medipart’s reconditioning was merely an act of repair, not reconstruction, and
therefore did not infringe. 252 The district court also enjoined Mallinckrodt from distributing a new notice to its hospital customers stating that
violation of the single use restriction was patent infringement. 253
On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling of
noninfringement. 254 The court also vacated the injunction, noting that
“[a] patentee that has a good faith belief that its patents are being infringed violates no protected right when it so notifies infringers.” 255 As
examples of “good faith” immunity in action, the Federal Circuit dis246

See, e.g., Int’l Indus., 145 F. Supp. at 35–36.
See, e.g., Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. Co., 299 F. 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1924).
248
Bicks, supra note 236, at 319.
249
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
250
Id. at 702.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 709–10.
255
Id. at 709.
247
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cussed the regional circuit case law predating the court’s creation, observing that:
Infringement notices have been enjoined when the patentee acted in
bad faith, for example by making threats without intending to file suit,
or when the patentee sent notices indiscriminately to all members of
the trade, or when the patentee had no good faith belief in the validity
of its patent. 256

In Mallinckrodt, the court did not discuss preemption because the
case did not contain any claims created by state law. But in an early case
in which the plaintiff sought to impose state law liability on a patent
holder due to its enforcement tactics, the Federal Circuit incorporated
both the flexible concept of good faith immunity discussed in Mallinckrodt and the Supreme Court preemption decisions summarized above. 257
In that case, Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., Dow filed a state law
claim of tortious interference based on statements made by Exxon to
Dow’s current and prospective customers stating that polymers made by
Dow infringed a patent owned by Exxon. 258 In its tort suit, Dow alleged
that Exxon did not have a good faith belief that the patent was infringed
and that Exxon had obtained its patent through inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 259 The district court dismissed Dow’s claim, refusing to consider evidence of Exxon’s inequitable conduct because, in the district court’s view, it would have been
improper to “reach beyond the scope of [the] given controversy to invalidate a patent” as part of a business tort case. 260 The district court also
ruled that Exxon, as the owner of a patent, which, under the Patent Act,

256

Id. at 710 (citations omitted) (citing Int’l Indus. & Devs., v. Farbach Chem. Co., 241
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1957); Magnetic Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1950); Betmar Hats, Inc. v. Young Am. Hats, Inc., 116 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1941)). The
court could also have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., in which the Court held that a defendant violates
the antitrust laws by “knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office”
during prosecution, but that the patent holder’s “good faith” (such as an “honest mistake”)
furnishes a complete defense. 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
257
See supra Subsection II.A.2.
258
139 F.3d 1470, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
259
Id. The doctrine of inequitable conduct permits a court to hold a patent unenforceable
if, during prosecution, the patent applicant misrepresented or omitted information material to
patentability with the specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO. See Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
260
Dow, 139 F.3d at 1472.
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is presumed to be valid, 261 was also “presumed to be acting in good
faith” when it “exercise[d] [its] right to exclude others from using the
invention.” 262
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and allowed Dow’s state law
claim to go forward. 263 In holding that Dow’s claim was not preempted,
the court noted that it was “difficult to fathom” how Dow’s tortious interference claim could compromise any of the objectives of the federal
patent laws identified in Kewanee (incentivizing invention, promoting
disclosure, and protecting the public domain). 264 Like the Supreme Court
in Kewanee, the Federal Circuit in Dow also recognized the traditional
role of the states in regulating this area of law, noting that “a key purpose behind” the ban on tortious interference “is the protection of the integrity of commercial contracts which . . . ‘traditionally are the domain
of state law.’” 265
In addition to its preemption analysis, the Federal Circuit in Dow
made clear that the plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the bad faith requirement discussed in Mallinckrodt. The court distinguished an earlier Federal Circuit opinion, which seemed to suggest that an unfair competition
claim based on the assertion of patent rights could never succeed,266 by
noting that “[t]he instant case . . . concerns an allegation of bad faith enforcement of a reputedly unenforceable patent.” 267 Specifically, Dow al-

261

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
Dow, 139 F.3d at 1472–73.
263
Id. at 1473.
264
Id. at 1475 (“[I]t seems most improbable that an inventor would choose to forfeit the
benefits of patent protection because of fear of the risk of being found tortiously liable based
upon attempting to enforce a patent obtained by inequitable conduct.”).
265
Id. (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)). Although
state law claims based entirely on a patent holder’s inequitable conduct before the PTO are
preempted under Federal Circuit law, see In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig.,
903 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (summarizing Federal Circuit decisions), the
claim in Dow also involved allegations of “bad faith misconduct in the marketplace,” specifically, the attempted enforcement of an unenforceable patent, and so was not preempted under that line of Federal Circuit cases, Dow, 139 F.3d at 1477.
266
See Concrete Unlimited v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding a patent invalid as obvious but reversing a finding of unfair competition without
inquiring into good or bad faith, noting that the patent holder “had the right to exclude others
from making, using, and selling the invention and to enforce those rights until the . . . patent
was held invalid” and that the patent holder “did only what any patent owner has the right to
do to enforce its patent, and that includes threatening alleged infringers with suit”), cited in
Dow, 139 F.3d at 1476.
267
Dow, 139 F.3d at 1476.
262
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leged that Exxon “knew that its patent was unenforceable” when it made
its statements to Dow’s customers. 268
Although the Federal Circuit in Dow engaged both the Supreme
Court’s preemption case law and the bad faith immunity rule, bad faith
became the sole focus of the Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis in its
next significant case involving state law claims based on patent enforcement, Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design. 269 In that case,
Harmonic and two of its licensees had informed purchasers of motorized
window shades that those licensees—and not Hunter Douglas—had an
exclusive license to sell window shades covered by Harmonic’s patents. 270 Hunter Douglas sued Harmonic and its licensees claiming that
Harmonic’s patents were invalid and unenforceable, and asserting several claims under California law, including unfair competition, injurious
falsehood, negligence, and intentional and negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage. 271
The Federal Circuit first rejected the defendants’ field preemption argument, noting that “state unfair competition law regulates conduct in a
different field from federal patent law” and that, in any case, “conflict
preemption is a more precise means of determining which state law
causes of action are preempted than the blunt tool of field preemption.” 272 Turning to conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit wrote, consistent with the Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause-based preemption
decisions, that the key question was “whether the state law actions frustrate[d] ‘the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” 273 But rather than considering the purposes of
federal patent law, such as those identified in Kewanee and Bonito Boats
(as well as by the Federal Circuit itself in Dow), the court stated that to
determine preemption, “we assess a defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct.” 274 The court elaborated: “If a plaintiff bases its tort action on conduct that is protected or governed by federal patent law, then the plaintiff may not invoke the state law remedy, which must be preempted for
conflict with federal patent law.” 275 Then, citing Mallinckrodt, the court
268

Id.
153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
270
Id. at 1322.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 1334–35.
273
Id. at 1335 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
274
Id.
275
Id.
269
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noted: “[F]ederal patent law bars the imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patent holder acted in bad faith.” 276 Ultimately, the court remanded the
case for the district court to analyze preemption under the bad faith
standard. 277
Hunter Douglas marked the first time that the Federal Circuit equated
bad faith with conflict preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Yet the
bad faith standard was not created as a rule of preemption. Indeed, shortly after deciding Hunter Douglas, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiffs
pursuing claims under federal law based on the defendant’s patent enforcement conduct—and therefore not raising any issue of preemption—
must also prove the defendant’s bad faith. 278 More importantly, bad faith
was originally a flexible concept that allowed courts to police unfair or
deceptive assertions of patent rights while protecting legitimate claims
of patent infringement. But, as discussed next, the Federal Circuit has
turned that concept into a rigid, two-part test that is very difficult for
plaintiffs to satisfy.
B. Equating Bad Faith with Noerr Immunity
In the wake of Hunter Douglas, the Federal Circuit began to evolve
its new bad faith “preemption” standard into a rule resembling the Noerr
doctrine’s sham litigation test. For example, in a decision issued four
months after Hunter Douglas, the court held that the objective accuracy
of infringement allegations shielded a patent holder from a state law
claim of intentional interference with existing and potential business relationships. 279 Although the Noerr doctrine also immunizes objectively
accurate statements from serving as the basis for liability, the Federal
Circuit still framed its holding as grounded in the bad faith standard, asserting—without any citation—that “[a]lthough ‘bad faith’ may encompass subjective as well as objective considerations . . . a competitive
commercial purpose is not of itself improper, and bad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate.” 280 Accordingly,
the court continued, “a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or
276

Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
278
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (involving a
claim of unfair competition under the Lanham Act).
279
Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, 165 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
280
Id. at 897.
277
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disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent
rights.” 281
In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc., the court again raised the bar for
plaintiffs seeking to impose liability for communications regarding patent infringement by holding that plaintiffs must prove bad faith by clear
and convincing evidence. 282 The court also bifurcated the bad faith
standard into a two-element test, holding that an accused infringer may
impose liability on a patent holder only if “the infringement allegations
are objectively false” and “the patentee made them in bad faith, viz.,
with knowledge of their incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either.” 283 In adopting the heightened standard of proof and bifurcating the
immunity test into objective and subjective components, the Federal
Circuit brought the bad faith rule even closer to the sham litigation test
under Noerr and its progeny. Although the Federal Circuit cited no authority for adopting the clear and convincing evidence requirement, several courts of appeals, including the Federal Circuit, have held that antitrust plaintiffs seeking to strip a defendant of Noerr immunity must
prove that litigation was a sham by clear and convincing evidence. 284
The court finally drew an explicit link between its bad faith preemption doctrine and Noerr immunity in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan
Computer Group, Inc. 285 In that case, the plaintiff, Greer, who was the
majority shareholder, chairman, and CEO of Elan, was negotiating an
agreement with Rainbow Technologies, Inc. in which Rainbow would
purchase all outstanding shares of Elan and provide Greer with a twoyear employment contract. 286 During the negotiations, Globetrotter’s
CEO sent an e-mail to Rainbow’s CEO suggesting that Rainbow investigate whether Elan’s products infringed Globetrotter’s patents. 287
Globetrotter also sent two letters directly to Greer alleging that Elan infringed Globetrotter’s patents. 288 Based on those communications, Greer
281

Id.
310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
283
Id.
284
See 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 199, ¶ 207b, at 319–22 (collecting cases); see
also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (adopting a clear
and convincing evidence standard).
285
362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
286
Id. at 1370.
287
Id.
288
Id.
282
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sued Globetrotter and its CEO under state law for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage and unfair competition. 289
The Federal Circuit held the state law claims preempted. According to
the court, Greer had improperly attempted to avoid preemption “only
through attempts to demonstrate subjective bad faith,” 290 such as by arguing that “the timing of Globetrotter’s e-mail and letters alleging infringement shows that Globetrotter sought only to interfere with Rainbow’s pending acquisition of Elan and agreement with Greer.” 291 Rather,
the court explained, to prove bad faith, a plaintiff must show “that the
claims asserted were objectively baseless.” 292 The court based the requirement of objective baselessness on the “jurisprudential background
of the bad faith standard,” which it found not in the Supremacy Clause
(as would be the case for a rule that is truly about preemption) but in antitrust cases such as Noerr and, in particular, Professional Real Estate
Investors, the decision in which the Supreme Court articulated the twoelement sham litigation test. 293
In discussing those cases, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that there
is some uncertainty about whether Noerr immunity, given its grounding
in the First Amendment right “to petition the government,” covers documents that are not actually filed in court, such as the e-mail and letters
in Globetrotter. Rather than confronting that difficult question, however,
the court simply observed that “our sister circuits, almost without exception, have applied the Noerr protections to pre-litigation communications.” 294 Likewise, on the issue of whether Noerr immunity should be
available to defendants faced with non-antitrust claims, such as the tort
and unfair competition claims asserted in Globetrotter, the court noted
that “in another line of cases, our sister circuits have also applied the
Noerr-Professional Real Estate line of cases to bar state-law liability (as
opposed to federal antitrust liability).” 295
Thus, the Federal Circuit has begun to acknowledge that its “preemption” decisions are based not on the Supremacy Clause, but on the Noerr

289

Id.
Id. at 1375.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1376.
295
Id.
290
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doctrine of petitioning immunity. 296 Yet the Federal Circuit’s case law is
still unsatisfying in several respects. Most notably, the court has abandoned, without explanation, the flexible, equitable bad faith standard and
replaced it with the rigid, two-part sham test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Professional Real Estate Investors. 297 To be sure, many federal
courts of appeals have, like the Federal Circuit, applied the sham litigation test to all types of civil claims, not just antitrust claims. 298 But the
Federal Circuit in Globetrotter did not even analyze whether that expansion was warranted. It simply noted that many other courts had applied
Noerr broadly, and went along with them. As a consequence, the Federal
Circuit did not engage the potentially important distinction between filings in litigation (that is, actual petitions to the government) and prelitigation communications or notices to the trade, which are not directed
to the government and that therefore would seem to be unprotected by
the Petition Clause. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the sham litigation test as currently applied by the Federal Circuit is almost impossible
for plaintiffs to satisfy. By my count, since Globetrotter, the Federal
Circuit has barred the state law claims in all but one case raising the issue. 299
296

Cf. id. at 1377 (“Our decision to permit state-law tort liability for only objectively baseless allegations of infringement rests on both federal preemption and the First Amendment.”).
297
It should be noted that this shift is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s often-discussed
preference for bright-line rules over flexible standards. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 771, 773–74 (2003). Likewise, preemption is
not the only non-antitrust area in which the Federal Circuit has, controversially, applied a
Noerr-like objective/subjective test. See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014) (overturning Federal Circuit case law that had required a prevailing party seeking attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act to prove that its opponent’s case was both objectively baseless and pursued in subjective bad faith); Halo Elecs. v.
Pulse Elecs., 769 F. 3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that
the court should reconsider en banc its application of an objective/subjective test for willful
infringement).
298
See supra note 198.
299
See Matthews Int’l Corp. v. Biosafe Eng’g, 695 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Contech Stormwater Solutions v. Baysaver Techs., 310 F. App’x 404, 409 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 800
Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Dominant Semiconductors
Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2008); GP Indus. v. Eran Indus., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Serio–US Indus. v. Plastic Recovery Techs.
Corp., 459 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But see Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment, holding
that “the question of whether [the patent holder’s] statements . . . were ‘objectively baseless’
is genuinely disputed”).
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Finally, the Federal Circuit’s “preemption” analysis, grounded in the
sham litigation test, ignores the federalism concerns that a true preemption analysis would engage. For example, the Supreme Court has often
articulated a presumption against preemption, stating that when addressing preemption questions “we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
[a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” 300 But the Federal Circuit has applied precisely the opposite presumption in its decisions involving state law claims, writing that “a party attempting to prove bad faith on the part of a patentee enforcing its
patent rights has a heavy burden to carry.” 301 The Federal Circuit’s invocation of Noerr as a preemption principle is also ironic given the Supreme Court’s holding in Parker v. Brown that the Sherman Act (the
statutory origin of Noerr immunity) was not intended to limit the authority of state governments or state officials. 302 More broadly, there is deep
tension between the sham litigation standard, which bars the government
from condemning any but the most frivolous acts of patent enforcement,
and many states’ emerging interest in regulating demand letters and other assertions of patent infringement. The next Part revisits the new state
laws and recent state law enforcement actions to show just how little
power the states—and the federal government—have under current Federal Circuit doctrine.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
Questions about the appropriate doctrinal basis for limiting government power to regulate patent enforcement—the Supremacy Clause, the
Noerr doctrine, or the long-standing good faith rule—are not merely academic. As discussed above, the Supremacy Clause arguably gives the

300

Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Some Justices dispute whether this presumption is warranted. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 624 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by
Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, J.) (“[T]he ‘presumption against pre-emption’ is [not] relevant to
the conflict pre-emption analysis. . . . [T]he sole question is whether there is an ‘actual conflict’ between state and federal law; if so, then pre-emption follows automatically by operation of the Supremacy Clause.”).
301
800 Adept, 539 F.3d at 1370.
302
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). For a summary of the complex antitrust
doctrine of “state action” immunity, see 1A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 199, ¶¶ 221–
31, at 46–268.
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states authority to condemn deceptive schemes of patent enforcement. 303
The rule of good faith immunity, as understood prior to the Federal Circuit’s creation, would limit that authority somewhat, but the Federal Circuit’s expansive application of Noerr immunity renders the states—and
the federal government—almost powerless. To properly frame a normative analysis of current Federal Circuit doctrine, it is worth highlighting
several practical implications of the status quo for government efforts to
address questionable tactics of patent enforcement.
A. A Legal Right to Lie?
A recent case from the Northern District of Illinois involving an infamous “Wi-Fi troll,” Innovatio IP Ventures, best illustrates the nearly
boundless immunity that patent holders have under current Federal Circuit doctrine. In that case, Innovatio sent letters to more than 8,000 end
users of Wi-Fi technology, such as restaurants and hotels, accusing them
of patent infringement. 304 In response, the manufacturers of the hardware
involved sued Innovatio, asserting a claim under the federal RICO statute and several claims under California state law, including unfair competition, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and tortious interference. 305
The manufacturers alleged that Innovatio’s letters not only misrepresented the merits of the infringement claims, but also that the letters contained numerous false statements, including statements that Innovatio
had “successfully licensed thousands of business locations under
the . . . [p]atents,” that Broadcom (the original owner of the patents) had
“generat[ed] in excess of $1 Billion in settlements and license fees,” and
that “the validity of many claims of the . . . patents ha[d] been confirmed
by both the Federal Circuit and the United States Patent Office, via both
judicial and re-examination proceedings.” 306 The complaint alleged that
those statements “grossly misrepresent[ed]” the number of licenses Innovatio had granted, that only one of the over thirty patents asserted had
actually had its validity confirmed through reexamination, and that most
of the $1 billion in settlements and license fees that Innovatio claimed
came from one $891 million payment that one company had reportedly

303

See supra Subsection II.A.3.
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
305
Id. at 906.
306
Id. at 920–21.
304
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paid Broadcom “as part of a broad settlement unrelated to Innovatio’s
licensing program.” 307
On Innovatio’s motion to dismiss, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ allegations as true but still dismissed the complaint because it did not satisfy the sham litigation standard. 308 Even though the complaint alleged
that Innovatio had lied in its demand letters, the court ruled that, even if
the complaint was correct about the falsity of Innovatio’s statements,
none of the statements were “sufficiently central to Innovatio’s infringement claims” to make the licensing campaign a sham. 309 Although
the court acknowledged that, in some circumstances, misrepresentations
can cause a party to forfeit immunity under Noerr, this rule, the court
explained, is “limited to misrepresentations respecting the substance of
the claim.” 310 By contrast, Innovatio’s statements about its past licenses
and prior confirmations of the patents’ validity were “peripheral to the
question of infringement” and did not strip Innovatio of immunity. 311
In the wake of In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, a
federal district court in Nebraska enjoined the state’s attorney general
from pursuing state law claims against MPHJ because the attorney general did not allege that MPHJ’s theories of validity and infringement
were objectively baseless. 312 As discussed above, the attorney general
had issued a cease-and-desist order enjoining MPHJ’s law firm from
“initiati[ng] . . . new patent infringement enforcement efforts within the
State of Nebraska,” asserting that the firm had potentially violated Nebraska’s consumer protection and deceptive trade practices statutes. 313 In
Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, MPHJ (along with Activision, another
client of the same law firm) sought to enjoin the attorney general from
enforcing the order, arguing that his action was preempted under Federal
Circuit law. 314 In response, the attorney general cited the “false and mis307

Id.
Id. at 922.
309
Id. at 921.
310
Id. (citing Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 394, 401–02 (4th Cir.
2001); Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1999); Kottle v. Nw.
Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998)).
311
Id. at 921–22.
312
See Activision TV, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 8:13-cv-215, slip op. at 13–14 (D. Neb. Sept.
2, 2014).
313
Letter from Jon Bruning, Att’y Gen. of Neb., to M. Brett Johnson, Partner, Farney Daniels LLP (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/234/2014/01/2013-07-18-AG-Cease-and-Desist-Order.pdf.
314
Activision, slip. op. at 11.
308
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leading representations” contained in MPHJ’s demand letters, 315 such as
MPHJ’s statements that many businesses had already purchased licenses
and that MPHJ intended to file suit against recipients who did not purchase a license.316 The court, however, held that to avoid preemption
under Federal Circuit law, the attorney general had to show that the patent holder’s theories of validity or infringement were objectively baseless. 317 Because the attorney general had not alleged that MPHJ’s patents
were invalid or that the infringement allegations were inaccurate, the
court ruled that the attorney general’s enforcement actions under Nebraska law were not permitted under Federal Circuit law, regardless of
any false or misleading statements in MPHJ’s letters. 318
Innovatio and Activision make clear that, so long as infringement allegations themselves are not objectively baseless, patent holders have, in
essence, “a legal right to lie.” 319 Allowing patent holders to falsely
threaten infringement litigation and to fabricate stories about the success
of a licensing program enhances the ability of patent holders to intimidate accused infringers into settlement. This is particularly true when, as
was the case in both Innovatio and Activision, the patent holder demands
a settlement that is less than the cost of hiring a lawyer to investigate—
much less to litigate—the infringement allegations.
B. Implications for the New State Statutes and State Law
Enforcement Actions
This broad immunity for pre-suit communications gives courts a clear
path to find some of the new state statutes invalid and to limit the application of others. The Wisconsin statute is particularly vulnerable. Recall
that Wisconsin’s statute can be violated in two ways: (1) if the patent
holder sends a demand letter that lacks the information required by the
statute, the recipient asks for that information, and the patent holder does
not provide the information within thirty days or (2) if the demand letter

315

Id. at 13.
See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 22–24, Activision, No.
8:13-cv-215 (D. Neb. Feb. 28, 2014).
317
Activision, slip op. at 13 (“[T]he crucial issues to establish objective[] baselessness involve validity and infringement.”).
318
Id. at 13–14.
319
Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls Getting First Amendment Protection for Their Demand
Letters, A.B.A. J., May 2014, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent_trolls_are_
getting_first_amendment_protection_for_demand_letters.
316
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“contain[s] false, misleading, or deceptive information.” 320 The portion
of the statute requiring demand letters to contain specific information is
almost certainly invalid under Federal Circuit law. The court has flatly
stated that “[t]he federal patent laws . . . bar state-law liability for communications concerning alleged infringement so long as those communications are not made in ‘bad faith.’” 321 The Wisconsin statute, however,
would subject a person making a good faith—indeed, an objectively accurate—assertion of patent infringement to state law liability for not including, for example, a list of other court proceedings involving the patent. 322
Also vulnerable under current doctrine are the Wisconsin statute’s
prohibition on false, misleading, or deceptive information, 323 and the
prohibition on false threats of infringement litigation found in several
states’ statutes. 324 As Innovatio and Activision suggest, patent holders
may be permitted to make false statements so long as those statements
do not relate to the issues of patent validity or infringement. Under Federal Circuit law, a state would be allowed to condemn letters that, for instance, threaten litigation based on a patent that was expired at the time
of the alleged acts of infringement because the patent’s expiration would
make the infringement claim itself objectively baseless. 325 But, under the
reasoning of Innovatio and Activision, a state cannot outlaw all false
statements in a letter asserting patent infringement nor can it condemn
false threats of litigation. Those statements are peripheral to the question
of infringement and, under current doctrine, are immunized from serving
as the basis for civil liability.

320

Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(b), (2)(c)(1)–(2) (2014).
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
322
See Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(a)(6); see also Mossoff, supra note 213, at 3–4 (suggesting
that statutes requiring particular information to be included in a demand letter violate constitutional restrictions on compelled speech).
323
Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(b); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1903(2)(b)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (Vermont-style statute stating that “a false or misleading statement” in a demand letter can provide evidence of bad faith).
324
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(1) (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 23 § 112(A)(1) (2014);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-10-102(a)(1) (2014); H.B. 589, Reg. Sess. § 2(1)(a) (Miss. 2015) (enacted); S.B. 39, 64th Leg. § 2(1)(a) (Mont. 2015) (enacted); see also Va. Code Ann. § 59.1215.2(B)(6) (2014) (Vermont-style statute suggesting that a finding of bad faith may be appropriate if “the person threatens legal action that . . . is not intended to be taken”).
325
See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2RRR(b)(3)(C).
321
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Statutes that follow Vermont’s lead and outlaw “bad faith” assertions
of patent infringement seem at first glance less susceptible to invalidation because the two-part sham litigation test is merely the Federal Circuit’s gloss on the long-standing bad faith standard. 326 But, as an initial
matter, none of the statutes require courts to find bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence, which the Federal Circuit has held is required to
condemn patent enforcement conduct. 327 More fundamentally, some of
the statutory factors defining bad faith encompass conduct that the Federal Circuit has held is insufficient to support liability. For example, the
Vermont statute suggests that a finding of bad faith is appropriate if
“[t]he claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless.” 328 This factor is similar to the Federal Circuit’s statement in Golan
that a plaintiff can avoid preemption by showing “that the infringement
allegations are objectively false, and that the patentee made
them . . . with knowledge of their incorrectness or falsity, or disregard
for either.” 329 Yet the Federal Circuit in Globetrotter subsequently held
that it is not sufficient to show that infringement allegations were “meritless” or “false.” Rather, they must be so baseless that no reasonable litigant could have expected success. 330 In addition, the versions of the
Vermont statute adopted in Idaho and Virginia make the patent holder’s
“subjective bad faith” a factor in determining whether the statute has
been violated, 331 but the Federal Circuit has made clear that “[s]ubjective
considerations of bad faith are irrelevant if the [infringement] assertions
are not objectively baseless.” 332
In sum, although the state statutes outlawing bad faith assertions of
infringement are perhaps not facially invalid, in application their scope
could be limited by Federal Circuit case law extending Noerr to all civil
claims based on any type of patent enforcement conduct, including pre326
See GP Indus. v. Eran Indus., 500 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have recently
determined that a bad faith standard cannot be satisfied in the absence of a showing that the
claims asserted were objectively baseless.” (citing Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1375)).
327
Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
328
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4197(b)(6) (2014).
329
310 F.3d at 1371.
330
Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1376. For the same reason, the Wisconsin statute’s prohibition on false statements, Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(b) (2014), may be invalid even when applied to allegations of infringement because Globetrotter requires that those allegations be
objectively baseless, not merely false.
331
Idaho Code Ann. § 48-1703(2)(f) (2014); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-215.2(B)(5) (2014).
332
GP Indus. v. Eran Indus., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1634

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1579

suit communications. No court has definitively ruled on the constitutionality of any of the new state statutes, but MPHJ has filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Vermont’s statute is unconstitutional, both facially
and as applied. In a brief order issued as this Article was being prepared
for publication, the district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss,
reasoning that MPHJ stated a plausible claim under both theories. 333
Not only could Federal Circuit case law limit the impact of the new
state statutes, it may impede state law enforcement actions against patent
holders. Thus far, the most notable state law enforcement action is the
suit filed by the Vermont attorney general against MPHJ alleging that
MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices.334 The unfair
trade practices cited in the complaint include: MPHJ stating that it
would bring suit against the recipients of its demand letter when in fact
MPHJ was “neither prepared nor likely to bring litigation,” MPHJ’s use
of lawyers to imply that it had performed a pre-suit investigation into the
alleged infringement, MPHJ’s pattern of targeting small businesses that
lack the resources to conduct patent litigation, and MPHJ’s use of shell
corporations to hide the true owners of the patents. 335 The deceptive
trade practices cited in the complaint include MPHJ’s statements that it
would sue within two weeks if the recipient did not purchase a license
and that its licensing program had received “a positive response from the
business community.” 336
Notably, although the complaint alleges that MPHJ “acted in bad faith
by sending [its] letters to Vermont businesses,” 337 the complaint does not
allege that the infringement allegations were made in bad faith. Indeed,
the state asserted in support of its motion to remand the case to state
court, and the district court agreed, that “[t]he State’s claims do not challenge the validity or scope of MPHJ’s patents nor do they require any
determination of whether infringement has actually occurred.” 338 Rather,
the court noted, “the State is targeting bad faith conduct irrespective of
333
MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. Sorrell, No. 2:14-cv-191, 2015 WL 3505224, at *9 (D. Vt.
June 3, 2015).
334
See supra Section I.B.
335
See Consumer Protection Complaint at 8–9, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No.
282-5-13wncv (Vt. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/
Vermont%20v%20MPHJ%20Technologies%20Complaint.pdf.
336
Id. at 9–10 (quoting one of MPHJ’s letters).
337
Id. at 8.
338
Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-170, 2014 WL 1494009, at *6 (D. Vt.
Apr. 15, 2014).
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whether the letter recipients were patent infringers or not, on the basis
that MPHJ’s bad faith conduct would be unlawful even [if] MPHJ’s patents were valid and the conduct was directed toward actual patent infringers.” 339 Without an allegation that MPHJ’s infringement claims
were objectively baseless, however, the state’s complaint appears strikingly similar to the complaint in Innovatio, which the district court dismissed because the alleged false statements were “peripheral to the
question of infringement.” 340
Forcing the state to prove not only the elements of its claim under
state law but also that the underlying patent infringement suit was baseless will likely deter state officials from bringing similar enforcement
actions in the future. State attorneys general have practically no experience litigating matters of federal patent law, such as validity and infringement. Moreover, it is very difficult to prove that infringement allegations were so baseless that no reasonable person in the patent holder’s
position could have expected to succeed. Patents are presumed to be valid, 341 meaning that invalidity must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. 342 Also, patent claim construction, which is often dispositive
of infringement, is notoriously unpredictable. 343 These factors make it
reasonable for a patent holder to have some hope of success even on a
weak claim of infringement. Thus, state attorneys general may find that
current doctrine makes it futile to challenge patent enforcement
schemes, whether under the new statutes or under pre-existing law.
C. Implications for Federal Law and Law Enforcement
Because the Federal Circuit has grounded its two-part “preemption”
test in the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, the federal government also has limited power to combat questionable patent enforcement
tactics. As part of an investigation into MPHJ, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a complaint against the company alleging that it
339

Id.
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
341
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
342
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
343
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1744–46 (2009). But see J. Jonas Anderson & Peter
S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent
Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (2014) (noting that appellate reversal rates
on the issue of claim construction have decreased in recent years).
340
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had engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 344 The FTC claimed that the company
violated Section 5 in two ways. First, it alleged that MPHJ said it would
“initiate legal action for patent infringement” if the recipient did not respond to its demand letters when, in fact, MPHJ was “not prepared to initiate legal action and did not intend to initiate legal action.” 345 Second,
the FTC alleged that MPHJ falsely or misleadingly stated “that substantial numbers of businesses who had received the . . . letters agreed to pay
substantial compensation to license the . . . [p]atents.” 346
Because MPHJ settled with the FTC, the First Amendment implications of the FTC’s investigation were never adjudicated. 347 However, a
court easily could have determined that the FTC’s complaint infringed
MPHJ’s right to petition as interpreted by the Federal Circuit and the
lower federal courts. The FTC’s first theory was based on MPHJ’s lack
of subjective intent to file suit, which is insufficient under Federal Circuit law to impose civil liability on a patent holder. 348 Moreover, that
theory, as well as the theory that MPHJ misrepresented the number of
businesses that had purchased licenses, could have run into the same
problem as the plaintiffs in Innovatio and the Nebraska attorney general
in Activision: attempting to impose liability based on false statements
that had nothing to do with the merits of the infringement claims.
In response to concerns about patent holders targeting end users,
Congress has begun to contemplate legislation that would regulate patent enforcement conduct. Under the courts’ interpretation of the Petition
Clause, however, Congress’s options are limited. A recent bill, the Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (“TROL”) Act, defines several types
of communications related to alleged patent infringement as unfair or

344
FTC Complaint, supra note 1, at 9; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”).
345
FTC Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
346
Id.
347
In January 2014, MPHJ sued the FTC seeking a declaration that the investigation violated the company’s First Amendment rights, but the court dismissed the complaint without
addressing the merits because, at the time, the FTC had not taken any final action. See MPHJ
Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11, slip op. at 6, 11–13 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2014).
348
See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (refusing to impose liability where the plaintiff attempted to demonstrate only subjective bad faith).
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deceptive acts under Section 5 of the FTC Act. 349 For example, the bill
would make it unlawful to, “in bad faith,” state or represent that “legal
action for infringement of the patent will be taken against the recipient”
or that “persons other than the recipient purchased a license for the patent asserted.” 350 The bill then outlines three ways in which bad faith can
be shown, defining the term as follows:
The term “bad faith” means . . . that the sender—
(A) made knowingly false or knowingly misleading statements, representations, or omissions;
(B) made statements, representations, or omissions with reckless indifference as to the false or misleading nature of such statements, representations, or omissions; or
(C) made statements, representations, or omissions with awareness of
the high probability of the statements, representations, or omissions to
deceive and the sender intentionally avoided the truth. 351

Some members of Congress have objected that the bad faith requirement will make it too difficult for the FTC to prove that a patent holder
violated the statute, 352 but that requirement is, as this Article has shown,
mandated by the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Petition Clause.
Moreover, even the narrow definition of bad faith in the bill may encompass conduct that is immunized under current law. For example, the
bill condemns any misleading statement in a demand letter, including
statements that are peripheral to the infringement allegations, such as
braggadocio about past licensing success. Yet, as Innovatio and Activision illustrate, such peripheral misrepresentations cannot be the basis
for civil liability under current law.
A bill recently introduced in the Senate, the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (“PATENT”) Act, raises similar difficulties.
349
Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. § 2(a). A
bill pending in the Senate contains provisions similar to the TROL Act. See Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (“STRONG”) Patents Act of 2015, S. 632,
114th Cong. §§ 201–04.
350
H.R. 2045 § 2(a)(1)(D), (F).
351
Id. § 5(1).
352
See Markup of Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2014: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
Cong. (Apr. 28–29, 2015) (remarks of Reps. Schakowsky (9:20), Eschoo (2:09:10), and Pallone (2:20:30)), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=8049&v=7EFOnDVuBYM.
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The bill would outlaw numerous specific actions taken by persons who
engage in the “widespread sending” of demand letters, such as engaging
in a pattern of falsely threatening infringement litigation, making statements related to patent validity, enforceability, or infringement that
“lack a reasonable basis in fact or law,” or sending letters “likely to materially mislead a reasonable recipient” because the letters do not contain
information about the patent holder, the asserted patent, or the recipient’s alleged infringement. 353 Under the bill, these prohibitions would be
enforced by the FTC through its existing authority. 354
The PATENT Act contains many of the same vulnerabilities as the
other statutes discussed thus far. For example, it condemns false threats
of litigation, which the Federal Circuit has suggested cannot be done.
Although the bill acknowledges the concept of objective baselessness by
condemning assertions that lack a reasonable basis in fact or law, the
Federal Circuit has held that objective baselessness alone is not sufficient to strip a patent holder of immunity—the patent holder also must
know that the allegation is baseless or act in reckless disregard for
whether the allegation is true or false.
In sum, reasonable minds might differ about whether policing unfair
or deceptive patent assertions is a function that should be handled by an
administrative agency, such as the FTC, or through legislation. Those
who support a legislative solution might also reasonably disagree about
the precise terms of any new statute and, of course, whether such a statute should be passed by Congress or by state legislatures. But the Federal Circuit’s expansive immunity standard precludes all three branches of
government at both the state and federal levels from regulating the enforcement tactic that is most troublesome: sending demand letters that
contain weak (but not frivolous) allegations of infringement and that use
misleading, deceptive, or false statements in an attempt to intimidate recipients into quickly purchasing a license. Fortunately, federal law already contains an alternative immunity standard that would allow governments to outlaw those tactics: the flexible good faith standard applied
by courts before the Federal Circuit adopted its current, Noerr-based
immunity rule.

353
354

Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 9(a).
Id.
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V. RETHINKING PETITIONING IMMUNITY IN PATENT CASES
Although state governments and the federal government are increasingly interested in regulating patent enforcement, the Federal Circuit has
left them powerless. Yet the court has offered no persuasive justification
for extending the broad antitrust immunity conferred by Noerr to all civil claims challenging patent enforcement conduct. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court should force a return to a narrower, more flexible immunity standard that accommodates the courts’
historical practice of condemning unfair and deceptive acts of patent enforcement.
A. Returning to Good Faith
Some scholars have argued that Noerr should never protect litigation
conduct as petitioning activity. 355 They contend that Noerr immunity
should be limited to its original context of petitions directed toward the
legislative and executive branches. Under that view, the Supreme Court
erred in cases such as California Motor Transport and Professional Real
Estate Inventors, which immunized defendants from antitrust claims
based on the pursuit of litigation. If that position is correct, then the Federal Circuit is almost certainly wrong in applying Noerr to claims that
seek to impose civil liability based on patent enforcement activity. If
documents that are actually filed in court are not protected by Noerr,
then surely patent demand letters, which are ostensibly a precursor to the
filing of litigation, should likewise not be entitled to Noerr immunity.
But even if Noerr does protect litigation or litigation-related conduct
as petitioning activity, there is, as discussed above, a reasonable argument that defendants should not be able to invoke Noerr as a defense
against claims not grounded in antitrust. 356 The holding in Noerr was “a
construction of the Sherman Act” adopted to avoid “important . . . questions” about the right to petition, informed by the Sherman Act’s purpose to regulate “business activity,” not “political activity.” 357 Most civil claims challenging patent enforcement are not asserted
under the antitrust laws, however. And the purpose behind laws on
wrongful civil proceedings and abuse of process—unlike antitrust law—
355

See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 188, at 397.
See supra text accompanying notes 201–21.
357
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–38
(1961).
356
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is plainly to regulate litigation conduct. Likewise, laws governing unfair
competition are designed to ensure the accuracy of information in the
marketplace, 358 and so are plausibly aimed at eliminating false or deceptive allegations of patent infringement that influence the market. Disparagement claims similarly target false statements intended to cause pecuniary harm, 359 so it is conceivable that false allegations of patent
infringement come within the purpose of that tort. And the intent of the
new state patent assertion statutes is obviously to regulate litigationrelated conduct. Thus, the statutory justification for Noerr immunity,
that is, that regulation of litigation conduct is outside the purpose of the
Sherman Act, is absent in the context of many civil claims used to challenge patent enforcement, leaving defendants reliant solely on the First
Amendment rights to petition and to free speech. Case law under those
constitutional provisions—unlike the Noerr doctrine—permits courts
and legislatures to condemn false and deceptive statements, 360 even if
those statements are attached to plausible legal claims. 361
When it comes to claims based on statements made in pre-litigation
communications, such as demand letters, the case for conferring Noerr
immunity is even weaker. The basic reasoning for extending Noerr to
pre-litigation communications has been clearly articulated by the Fifth
Circuit:
Given that petitioning immunity protects . . . litigation, it would be absurd to hold that it does not protect those acts reasonably and normally

358
See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Schotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 Handbook
of Law and Economics 1473, 1536 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
359
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A (1977).
360
See supra text accompanying notes 210–14.
361
The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether, under the Noerr doctrine itself, defendants may be stripped of liability for “fraud or other misrepresentations” made to a court.
See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61–62 n.6 (1993).
To date, the lower courts have mostly concluded that, to strip a defendant of Noerr immunity, any misrepresentation must be so severe as to “deprive the litigation of its legitimacy.”
Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Cheminor Drugs,
Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1999) (refusing to consider intentional misrepresentation as an independent ground for stripping a party of Noerr immunity, noting that
“[i]f the alleged misrepresented facts do not infect the core of [the] claim . . . , then the petition had an objective basis and will receive . . . immunity”). That line of cases influenced the
court’s decision in Innovatio to immunize the patent holder’s allegedly false statements
about the reexamination of its patents and its previous licensing efforts. In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Kottle, 146
F.3d at 1060, and Cheminor, 168 F.3d at 124).
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attendant upon effective litigation. The litigator should not be protected only when he strikes without warning. If litigation is in good faith,
a token of that sincerity is a warning that it will be commenced and a
possible effort to compromise the dispute. 362

Although pre-filing communications make it possible to resolve a
dispute without calling on the public resources of the courts, there are
reasons to pause before extending Noerr immunity to all pre-litigation
communications. To begin with, there is the constitutional text. Assuming that Noerr immunity is based on the First Amendment, as the Federal Circuit has indicated, 363 it is absurd to say that a letter between private
parties is a “petition” to “the government” within the meaning of the Petition Clause. 364 The Tenth Circuit, in a decision that represents a minority view, has held that “[a] letter from one private party to another
private party simply does not implicate the right to petition.” 365 But ignoring the constitutional text is usually justified based on the policy argument, embraced by the Fifth Circuit in the passage quoted above, that
immunizing threats to sue encourages out-of-court settlement, saving the
courts’ time and effort. 366
If, however, the sender is using the threat itself to extract a payment
and has no intention to actually file suit, then it is not clear that the threat
should be protected. 367 Similarly, even if the infringement allegations
made in a demand letter are considered to constitute petitioning activity
protected by the First Amendment, ancillary statements that have nothing to do with the infringement claim seem less worthy of immunity,
particularly when those ancillary statements are false or misleading or
are designed to induce the recipient to purchase a license without retain362

Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983).
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
364
See Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 1019 (2003) (raising the textual argument that “a communication that
does not attempt to persuade a governmental decision-maker to do something is not a petition and is outside the scope of the Noerr principle”).
365
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 892 (10th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
366
See, e.g., 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 199, ¶ 205f, at 302 (“Although a mere
threat directed at one’s competitor to sue or to seek administrative relief does not involve or
‘petition’ the government, it would be anomalous and socially counterproductive to protect
the right to sue but not the right to threaten suit.”).
367
See John T. Delacourt, Protecting Competition by Narrowing Noerr: A Reply, 18 Antitrust 77, 78 (2003).
363
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ing an attorney to investigate the infringement allegations. 368 Punishing
patent holders who send those types of letters will not discourage or inhibit patent holders who make assertions of patent infringement in a legitimate attempt to avoid going to court.
This is not to say that patent holders should have no leeway when
making infringement allegations. Indeed, the law should protect patent
holders who make plausible but unsuccessful allegations of infringement, so long as the allegations are made in a way that is neither unfair
nor deceptive. Fortunately, those goals can be attained without granting
patent holders the broad immunity that Noerr confers on antitrust defendants. Rather, courts can and should return to first principles: the
flexible, equitable good faith standard to which the Federal Circuit’s
current immunity doctrine traces its roots. As discussed, pre-Federal
Circuit decisions allowed patent holders to make legitimate assertions of
patent infringement while also permitting injunctions against patent
holders based on their bad faith. That bad faith standard included both
subjective considerations (such as the patent holder’s lack of intent to
file a threatened infringement suit) and objective considerations (such as
the weakness of the infringement claim on the merits). Returning to this
flexible standard would allow governments, both state and federal, to
condemn the assertions of infringement that are most troublesome.
For example, a patent holder who threatens numerous end users with
an infringement suit, with no intent to actually file suit, could be subjected to civil liability. An illustrative pre-Federal Circuit case is Adriance, Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., in which the patent holder
sent letters to the plaintiff’s customers, claiming that it would “sue all
dealers” who purchased the allegedly infringing goods manufactured by
the plaintiff and that it was “constantly bringing suits wherever these
dealers are found” when, in fact, it had never actually filed an infringement suit. 369 The Second Circuit enjoined the patent holder from sending
additional letters, noting that the previous letters “were inspired by a
purpose to intimidate the [plaintiff’s] customers, and [to] coerce the
[plaintiff], by injuring its business, into becoming a licensee of the defendant.” 370 “In view of its failure to bring an infringement action,” the
368

Cf. Elhauge, supra note 194, at 1215 (arguing that Noerr immunity should not protect
“restraints resulting from activities that [are] . . . separate from [a] valid effort to influence
the government”).
369
121 F. 827, 829–30 (2d Cir. 1903).
370
Id. at 830.
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court wrote, “the defendant cannot shelter itself behind the theory that its
circulars and letters were merely legitimate notices of its rights.” 371
Similarly, a patent holder who makes allegations of infringement
without having investigated the supposed acts of infringement—as is
almost certainly the case when a patent holder sends letters to thousands
of alleged infringers—would not be entitled to immunity under the traditional bad faith standard. As the Federal Circuit noted in Mallinckrodt,
under that standard, courts had enjoined infringement notices “when the
patentee sent notices indiscriminately to all members of the trade.” 372 In
more recent cases, however, the Federal Circuit has prohibited plaintiffs
from relying on the patent holder’s lack of investigation into the alleged
infringement to prove bad faith. 373
Furthermore, a return to the traditional standard would free courts
from the Noerr-based principle, embraced in Innovatio and Activision,
that any false statement must relate to the issues of validity or infringement to strip a patent holder of immunity. Pre-Federal Circuit decisions,
for example, condemned patent holders who circulated notices that
“falsely stated and pretended that certain patents owned by the [patent
holder] ha[d] been adjudicated and sustained in contested cases.” 374 This
change in the law would enable private plaintiffs and government law
enforcers, such as the FTC and state attorneys general, to impose civil
liability on unscrupulous patent holders without having to take the diffi-

371

Id.
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 710 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Int’l
Indus. & Devs. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 241 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1957)); see also United States
v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (imposing liability on a patent
holder in part because “there were two or three instances where suit was threatened involving machines that agents of defendants had never even seen”).
373
See, e.g., Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254,
1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the plaintiff’s arguments that the patent holder did not
test the accused products, construe the claims of the patents, or “consider[] an earlier analysis of [the plaintiff’s] products suggesting that infringement was an open question,” noting
that the plaintiff’s arguments “might be probative of subjective baselessness, but they do not
help to show that a jury reasonably could find that [the plaintiff] could meet its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant’s] infringement allegations
were objectively baseless”).
374
A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900); accord Gerosa
v. Apco Mfg. Co., 299 F. 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1924) (affirming order granting an injunction and
damages to a defendant in an infringement case where the patent holder had “sen[t] circulars
to the trade and to a great number of defendant’s customers . . . with the evident purpose of
representing that [it] had won [previous infringement] suits,” when, in fact, the suits had
been settled).
372
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cult additional step of disproving the merits of the underlying infringement claim.
B. Objections and Responses
One might reasonably be concerned that allowing governments more
leeway to regulate assertions of patent infringement would compromise
the rights of patent holders with legitimate claims. But, to be clear, the
cases in which courts should find bad faith are exceptional. In the past,
those cases often involved statements by patent holders that were plainly
false, 375 legal claims that were objectively weak on the merits, 376 or both.
Thus, a good faith immunity standard would provide ample protection
for patent holders to provide legitimate notice of their patent rights.
One might also object that state laws regulating unfair or deceptive
patent enforcement are unnecessary because shake-down settlements are
not particularly common. For instance, a draft complaint prepared by the
FTC as part of its investigation into MPHJ claimed that, of the over
16,000 businesses that received a letter, only seventeen purchased licenses. 377 If few people are in fact harmed by this activity, then it may
not be worth rewriting the law. That said, MPHJ’s campaign is an extreme example because its dubious enforcement tactics were so heavily
publicized, making it less likely that recipients would feel compelled to
purchase a license. Many patent holders target relatively unsophisticated
organizations on a smaller scale, 378 and some of those patent holders actually pursue litigation in court as a source of further leverage. 379 Data
about patent settlements is hard to come by, in part because targets are
usually not eager to publicize the fact that they have been accused of infringement or that they have paid to make the allegations go away. 380

375

See supra notes 369–73 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Int’l Indus. & Devs. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 145 F. Supp. 34, 36 (S.D. Ohio
1956).
377
Complaint exhibit F, at 9, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 13, 2014), available at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/FTC-MPHJ.
draf_.complaint.pdf (excerpting FTC draft complaint against MPHJ).
378
Hearing on the Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on Innovation and the Economy Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
113th Cong. 6 (Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Charles Duan, Director of Patent Reform Project,
Public Knowledge), available at https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/Charles%20Patent%20
Testimony%20Final.pdf.
379
Chien & Reines, supra note 13, at 235–37.
380
Boushie et al., supra note 70.
376
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Furthermore, for patent disputes that are resolved out of court, there is
no threat of judicial sanction for frivolous or abusive tactics, 381 and legislative proposals to award prevailing parties their attorneys’ fees provide little help. 382 Thus, allowing governments to condemn unfair or deceptive enforcement practices fills a regulatory gap, even if it is difficult
to quantify the harm from those practices. 383
One might also suggest that the new state statutes are largely symbolic because they merely replicate existing laws, as illustrated by Vermont’s suit against MPHJ under the state’s pre-existing consumer protection statute. 384 Although there is overlap between pre-existing law
and the new statutes, patent-specific statutes are not superfluous. State
statutes generally prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices sometimes protect individuals only, not the business entities that are likely to
be the targets of patent demand letters. 385 Moreover, statutes prohibiting
deceptive trade practices do not uniformly allow the plaintiff to recover
damages, 386 as is possible under most of the new patent-specific statutes.
In addition, deceptive trade practice statutes frequently limit the court’s
ability to award attorneys’ fees, 387 unlike the new statutes, most of which
simply state that the court “may award” fees. Although a comprehensive
examination of unfair and deceptive trade practice law is beyond this
Article’s scope, the point is that statutes aimed specifically at patent enforcement could add meaningful content.
381

Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (permitting judicial sanctions for frivolous or abusive court filings).
See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015); see also Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2515455 (noting that most intellectual
property disputes are resolved out of court).
383
There is, of course, a rich literature attempting to quantify the social harm of NPEs
more generally. As a small sample, see Bessen & Meurer, supra note 14, at 389–406; Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 461, 463–65 (2014); James
Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls,
Regulation, Winter 2011–12, at 26.
384
Johnson, supra note 30, at 2072.
385
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CIV-03-4558, 2008
WL 4126264, at *22 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008) (applying the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Joy A. McElroy, M.D., Inc. v. Maryl Grp., 114 P.3d 929, 941 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005)
(applying Hawaii statute condemning “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”); see also Nat’l
Consumer Law Ctr., Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 138–39 n.1864 (8th ed. 2012)
(collecting cases).
386
See Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 3(a) (1966) (providing for injunctions
only).
387
See id. § 3(b) (permitting award of attorneys’ fees only if the defendant “willfully engaged in the trade practice knowing it to be deceptive”).
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CONCLUSION
The objective of this Article has not been to argue that regulation of
patent enforcement should be left to the states. 388 Rather, the aim has
been to highlight that, under Federal Circuit law, no government body—
state or federal; legislative, administrative, or judicial—can meaningfully police dubious tactics of patent enforcement, and to argue that the
broad immunity enjoyed by patent holders is unwarranted. But is there a
case for greater state involvement in regulating patent enforcement?
State-by-state regulation would certainly inject legal disuniformity into a
patent system in which uniformity is highly valued. 389 Accordingly, the
proposed federal TROL Act would expressly preempt the new state statutes regulating patent enforcement. 390 But the bill would not bring about
perfect uniformity because it would not preempt “any State consumer
protection law, any State law relating to acts of fraud or deception, [or]
any State trespass, contract, or tort law,” 391 all of which have been and
would continue to be relied on to challenge acts of patent enforcement.
Moreover, legal uniformity is not a goal that should be pursued at all
costs, 392 for any fragmentation that flows from state-by-state regulation
could actually help combat unscrupulous enforcement tactics. Bottom
feeders such as MPHJ and Innovatio attempt to capitalize on the fact that
litigating a patent suit is expensive. By some estimates, it costs nearly a
million dollars to defend against even the smallest infringement suit. 393
388
For an analysis of whether unfair and deceptive acts of patent enforcement should be regulated by the states or by the federal government, see Hearing on Patent Demand Letter Practices and Solutions Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 18–24 (Feb. 26, 2015) (statement of Paul R. Gugliuzza, Associate Professor of Law, Boston Univ. Sch. of Law), available at http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20150226/103029/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-GugliuzzaP-20150226.pdf
(suggesting that demand letter regulation should “emphasize[] the respective strengths of
state governments and the federal government”).
389
See Gugliuzza, supra note 24, at 17–27 (describing how the policy of uniformity drives
important decisions about patent law and the patent system).
390
Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. § 4(a)(1)
(preempting “any law, rule, regulation, requirement, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law of any State . . . expressly relating to the transmission or contents of
communications relating to the assertion of patent rights”); accord Support Technology and
Research for Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 204(a)(1).
391
H.R. 2045 § 4(a)(2); accord S. 632 § 204(a)(2).
392
Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 65, 68 (2015)
(arguing that empirical progress in patent policy depends on greater legal diversity).
393
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey (2013), available at http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013AIPLA%20Survey.pdf.
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It is therefore often cheaper for defendants to settle rather than to fight.
State-by-state regulation has the potential to turn the table. Rather than
defending against, say, one unfair competition suit brought by the FTC,
a patent holder might instead need to defend against multiple lawsuits in
multiple states, brought by both private plaintiffs and state attorneys
general. MPHJ, for example, has been sued by the state of Vermont and
has been investigated by the FTC and by attorneys general in at least
three states. The prospect of ex post litigation on multiple fronts could
be a significant deterrent to unfair or deceptive assertions of patent infringement.

